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ABSTRACT
This article wrestles with a seemingly straightforward question that
turns out to be surprisingly complex: what is a bank? The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC) recently began offering special
purpose national bank (SPNB) charters to entities that are, at best, banklike. But are they banks or not? Although the OCC considers SPNBs to be
banks, not everyone is sure to agree, including bankruptcy judges. The
question matters because banks are ineligible for bankruptcy relief. This
Article considers the legal and policy arguments that are likely to be
presented to bankruptcy judges about whether SPNBs are banks and
concludes that bankruptcy judges are likely to disregard the OCC’s
interpretation and conclude SPNBs are not banks. If SPNBs are bankruptcyeligible because they are not banks, a host of issues arise. For example, can
a SPNB rush to bankruptcy court to take advantage of the automatic stay if
the OCC tries to revoke its charter? Will bankruptcy courts or the OCC
control the resolution of a financially distressed SPNB? How fast and by
what processes will their financial trouble be resolved? This Article
explores these questions.

INTRODUCTION
The number and importance of fintech companies, such as Venmo,
CashApp, SoFi, Square, PayPal, and Plaid, continue to rise.1 Some of the
companies, like the payment processor PayPal, are often household names.
Others have less name-recognition but are widely used. For example, most
people have probably used Square’s ubiquitous and eponymous credit card
reader. Still others are more specialized lenders, such as SoFi—known to
refinance student loans for a limited subset of consumers.2 And Plaid, which
provides behind-the-scenes financial services infrastructure that many
1. There is no singular definition of a fintech company. A common definition is that
they are “predominantly online, nonbank financial companies using [artificial intelligence or
machine learning techniques] to parse unconventional data” in an attempt to increase credit
access, lower costs, and/or improve customer satisfaction. See, e.g., Matthew Adam
Bruckner, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning: The Opportunities and Challenges
of Using Big Data, in OPEN BANKING (OXFORD U. PRESS 2022, Linda Jeng, ed.); see infra note
45.
2. See David Zaring, Modernizing the Bank Charter, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397,
1449 (2020) (discussing various banking-adjacent fintech companies and noting several of
them “. . . exist on the Internet and can serve anyone with Internet access. . . .”).
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consumers use, may be the most used and least known fintech out there.3
Inevitably, some of these firms, or others like them, will go broke.4
When they do, there are various legal processes available to address the
firms’ financial woes and resolve the claims of their employees, landlords,
financiers, shareholders, and other stakeholders. Yet the available legal
processes are distinctly different depending on whether a distressed firm is a
bank or a non-bank entity.5 As a result, whether an entity is classified as a
bank matters.
Bankruptcy is a commonly used pathway for resolving the financial
problems of distressed entities, and is available to for-profit businesses, nonprofit entities, family farms, individual debtors, and even cities.6 But a few
types of entities are excluded from using bankruptcy, including “banks.”7
Failed banks with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) are typically resolved through an FDIC receivership.8

3. See https://plaid.com/company/ [https://perma.cc/Y3SV-E3EW] (last accessed, Mar.
20, 2021).
4. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency
Regulation, 76 TEX. L. REV. 723, 726 (1998) [hereinafter Skeel, Law & Finance] (“As
competition in . . . [banking and insurance] markets has intensified, it has become inevitable
that some banks and insurance companies will fail as a consequence of market pressures.”).
5. Insurance companies also have a different set of legal processes available.
6. See, e.g., Matthew A. Bruckner, Special Purpose Municipal Entities and Bankruptcy:
The Case of Public Colleges, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEVELOPMENTS J. 341 (2020) (discussing
the availability of bankruptcy relief for public universities).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (detailing who may be a debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code); see also Michael I. Sovern, Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act: The Excluded
Corporations, 42 MINN. L. REV. 171, 171–72 (1957). Some entities that are not specifically
excluded by section 109 are nevertheless denied access to bankruptcy. For example,
marijuana-related businesses generally may not be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. See
Vivian Cheng, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 30 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 105 (2013). Other entities are not legally excluded but will find that Chapter
11’s use presents an effective death sentence. See, e.g., Matthew Adam Bruckner,
Bankrupting Higher Education, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 714 (2017) (discussing why colleges
and universities tend not to use bankruptcy). Still, others may use bankruptcy but are
“bankruptcy misfits.” See Laura N. Coordes, Bespoke Bankruptcy, 73 FLA. L. REV. 359, 373
(2021)
[S]ome bankruptcy misfits do exhibit a need for bankruptcy and are not
accommodated by the Bankruptcy Code. There is a ‘default assumption’ among
scholars and policymakers that bankruptcy relief should be widely available to
those that need it. And although some bankruptcy misfits exhibit a demonstrated
need for bankruptcy relief, use of the Bankruptcy Code creates significant
problems that may outweigh any practical benefits of the bankruptcy process.
8. Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency
Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation, FRB OF CHICAGO WORKING PAPER No.
2006-0142 (Jan. 10, 2006), at 1 [hereinafter Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison].
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However, not all banks are FDIC insured. The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (“OCC”), which charters national banks, recently finalized new
rules for addressing the financial troubles of the subset of uninsured national
banks.9 While historically this has been a small subset of banks, it is a subset
with rapidly increasing importance because it is the form many fintechs may
take.
Excluding banks from bankruptcy has traditionally been justified by the
differences between banks and non-bank entities, especially the propensity
for banks to hold consumer deposits.10 Bank deposits are widely held by
residents, making bank depositors a group that politicians are particularly
keen to protect. But there are other traditional justifications for special rules
for addressing bank insolvency, including banks’ role in regulating the
country’s money supply, the need to avoid bank runs, and concerns about
banks’ systemic importance, among others.11 Whether these traditional
justifications are sufficient to defend the exclusion of depository institutions
from bankruptcy is contested.12 But this Article argues these justifications
9. See 12 C.F.R. § 51. It is possible that some entities will be resolved through the
Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) instead of the OCC receivership process. To be
eligible for OLA, an entity must not be an insured depository institution and the Secretary of
the Treasury must have determined that
(1) the financial company is in default or in danger of default; (2) the failure of
the financial company and its resolution under otherwise applicable Federal or
State law would have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United
States; (3) no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent the default
of the financial company; (4) any effect on the claims or interests of creditors,
counterparties, and shareholders of the financial company and other market
participants as a result of actions to be taken under this subchapter is appropriate,
given the impact that any action taken under this subchapter would have on
financial stability in the United States; (5) any action under section 5384 of this
title would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects, taking into consideration the
effectiveness of the action in mitigating potential adverse effects on the financial
system, the cost to the general fund of the Treasury, and the potential to increase
excessive risk taking on the part of creditors, counterparties, and shareholders in
the financial company; (6) a Federal regulatory agency has ordered the financial
company to convert all of its convertible debt instruments that are subject to the
regulatory order; and (7) the company satisfies the definition of a financial
company under section 5381 of this title.” 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b) and § 5381(a)(8)
(defining a “covered financial company
10. See infra Section III.; see also Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note
8, at 2–3. But see Sovern, supra note 7, at 172–75 (reviewing the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Act and concluding that the reason why banks are excluded from bankruptcy is
not well-established).
11. See infra Section III.
12. See also Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at 3, n.3 (“The
‘banks are special’ argument focuses primarily on the banking system as whole and individual
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cannot justify the exclusion of non-depository institutions from bankruptcy,
as the OCC’s regulatory scheme plans to do.13
Whether an entity can access the bankruptcy system has important
implications, both for the nation and for the entity’s management, creditors,
and customers.14 The OCC’s bank resolution process differs from the
bankruptcy process in important ways, including: who initiates the financial
resolution process, control over the process, participation rights for
interested parties, the automatic stay, and others.15 In particular, the
Bankruptcy Code favors retaining existing management’s control over the
entity during the bankruptcy case and attempting to rehabilitate debtors by,
among other things, staying all actions against the debtor or its property
during the course of the bankruptcy case.16 By contrast, the OCC
large systemically important banks. Less of a case has been articulated for the special
importance of individual small banks.”). Compare Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why
Banks are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 991 (2010) (“Unlike
corporate bankruptcy, bank resolution procedures concentrate decision-making in a single
entity with the financial interest in making the right decision about how to dispose of the
assets.”) with Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L.
469, 481 (2010) (“Drexel showed, nearly two decades before Lehman, that bankruptcy need
not take too long to effectively resolve the financial distress of a financial institution.”).
13. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s and FDIC’s Attempts to Confer
Banking Privileges on Nonbanks and Commercial Firms Violate Federal Laws and Are
Contrary to Public Policy, 39 BANKING & FIN. SRVC.’S POL’Y REP. 1 (2020). But see
RECEIVERSHIPS FOR UNINSURED NATIONAL BANKS, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, [Docket ID OCC-2016-0017], https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-relea
ses/2016/nr-occ-2016-160a.pdf [https://perma.cc/39EH-7U9H] at *10, n.4 (“The OCC is not
aware of any opinion of a U.S. Bankruptcy Court, or any other U.S. court, finding that an
uninsured national bank is eligible to be a debtor subject to a petition under the Code.”);
14. See infra Section IV.
15. See infra Section IV. and Appendix; cf. Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, A
comparison of U.S. corporate and bank insolvency resolution, Economic Perspectives, Vol.
30, 2nd, No. 2, 2006, https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-perspectives/2006
/2qtr-part4-bliss-kaufman [https://perma.cc/M2RX-PKXY] [hereinafter Bliss & Kaufman,
Comparison]. This paper will not draw a comparison to OLA for several reasons, including
my view that the failure of firms with a SPNB charter are not likely to have “serious adverse
effects on financial stability in the United States.” 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2). See infra text
following note 50. Some commentators disagree. See, e.g., HILARY J. ALLEN, DRIVERLESS
FINANCE, 222 (forthcoming OXFORD U. PRESS 2022) (“. . . fintech isn’t ‘too small to care’
about. Regulators’ current ‘wait and see’ approach is sometimes justified on the grounds that
fintech is too niche a sector to have a real impact on financial stability, but this view is
misinformed at best, and disingenuous at worst.”)
16. This is only true as a general matter. See Bliss & Kaufman, Comparison, supra note
15 (discussing how the Bankruptcy Code offers greater rights for existing management than
the OCC receivership process and noting that restructuring is possible in bankruptcy but not
in an OCC receivership). More recently, bankruptcy sales and restructuring support
agreements have grown in importance and lenders are routinely able to displace old
management. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Jared Elias, Bankruptcy Process for Sale,
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receivership process is an administrative, rather than judicial, process that
displaces existing management and shareholders.17 Differences are further
summarized in the Appendix.
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (Dec. 4, 2020 draft) (providing empirical
support that “[t]he lenders that fund Chapter 11 reorganizations exert significant influence
over the bankruptcy process through the contract associated with the debtor-in-possession
(‘DIP’) loan.”); David A. Skeel Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy, 130 YALE L.
J. 366, 373–74 (2020) (arguing that distortive techniques surrounding restructuring support
agreements ought to be permitted because “[f]inancial distress must now be resolved much
more quickly, both because the value of many troubled companies is evanescent and because
lenders and other creditors use debtors’ need for liquidity as leverage to compress the timeline
of the case.”); Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, The Proceduralist Inversion – A Response
to Skeel, 130 YALE L. J. 335, 350 (2020) (in contrast to Skeel, Janger and Levitin offer a
proceduralist approach by “advocat[ing] three reforms to limit the ability of various types of
claimants to exercise power over plan confirmation beyond that reflected by their real
economic interest.”); Barry E. Adler, The Creditors’ Bargain Revisited, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
1853 (2018); Robert K. Rasmussen, Taking Control Rights Seriously, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
1749, 1755, 1757 (2018) (noting “ . . . the past two decades have seen an increase in the ability
of debt holders to influence the conduct of the business and the course of the Chapter 11
proceeding. It is now commonplace for creditors to be the driving force behind reorganization
efforts.” Also demonstrating how “[l]ending contracts . . . often provide a basis by which the
lender can affect and constrain management’s exercise of the control that it enjoys over the
company.”); Matthew A. Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar:
Imposing a Preliminary Injunction Standard for Objections to § 363 Sales, 62 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1, 22 & n.142 (2012) [hereinafter, Bruckner, Bankruptcy Sales] (highlighting “ . . . the
perception that . . . secured creditors have too much influence over the debtor [in sales] . . .
particularly if they have provided the debtor-in-possession financing on which the debtor is
relying or if they have liens on the debtor’s cash collateral.”).
17. See Helen Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1159, 1172 (1989)
(“. . . regulatory dispositions of failed banks generally result in the prompt removal of
shareholders and management from the bargaining process. Whether the bank is liquidated or
its assets and liabilities are transferred to another bank, its managers immediately lose their
jobs.”); see also Bliss & Kaufman, Comparison, supra note 15, at 44
In particular, the general corporate bankruptcy code in the U.S. tends to favor
debtors over creditors and, especially for large insolvent firms, in-place managers
and attempted rehabilitation (Chapter 11) rather than liquidation (Chapter 7). In
contrast, the bank insolvency code favors depositors (usually the major class of
bank creditors) over debtors, and encourages speedy legal closure and resolution
at the expense of in-place management and attempts at rehabilitation. Differences
with the general corporate bankruptcy code are further widened through an
emphasis on formalized early intervention prior to insolvency, quick declaration
of insolvency, prompt termination of the bank charter and shareholder control
rights, ousting of senior management, strict enforcement of legal priorities of the
different creditor classes, potential speed of resolution, lack of creditor standing,
limited judicial review, and administrative, rather than judicial, proceedings. The
fundamentally different approaches to insolvency resolution of banks and
nonbanks derive in part from differences in the goals that these procedures seek
to achieve.
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In December 2016, the OCC finalized the rules that it intends should
govern the resolution of uninsured national banks.18 Nineteen months later,
the OCC announced that it would begin accepting applications for its socalled Special Purpose National Bank (SPNB) charters from non-depository
fintech lending firms.19 Since then, the OCC has also begun accepting
applications for a SPNB charter for companies that handle payments.20 Its
authority to do so has been fiercely contested as being ultra vires and remains
deeply uncertain at this time because of litigation against the OCC, litigation
that has been brought repeatedly by the New York State Department of
Financial Services (NYSDFS) and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors
(CSBS).21
18. See 12 C.F.R. § 51.
19. See OCC, Policy Statement on Financial Technology Companies’ Eligibility to Apply
for National Bank Charters (July 31, 2018), available at: https://www.occ.treas.gov/publicat
ions/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintec
h.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/8AY5-ETJW] [hereinafter OCC, Policy Statement].
20. See OCC, Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies
(2016), at 2 https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/responsible-innovatio
n/comments/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/WYC3-X
CUK] (last accessed Mar. 21, 2021) [hereinafter, OCC, Exploring SPNB Charters] (writing
that it may be in the “public interest” to offer bank charters to nonbank companies that offer
banking-related products); see also Mindy Harris, OCC Previews Plans to Introduce Special
Purpose National Bank Charter for Payment Companies, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (July 9,
2020), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2020/07/09/occ-previews-plans-to-introd
uce-special-purpose-national-bank-charter-for-payment-companies/ [https://perma.cc/HME9
-6AR8] (“As envisioned, the payments charter would replace the state-by-state money
transmitter licensing approach currently used by many non-bank payment processors and
FinTechs.”).
In addition, at least two crypto companies have recently received special purpose trust
bank charters from the OCC. See Nikhilesh De & Ian Allison, Anchorage Becomes First
OCC-Approved National Crypto Bank, COINDESK (Jan. 14, 2021, 11:33 AM), https://www.c
oindesk.com/anchorage-becomes-first-occ-approved-national-crypto-bank (Anchorage) [http
s://perma.cc/G6SQ-BHYY]; John Reosti, OCC approves trust charter for second crypto firm,
AM. BANKER (Feb. 05, 2021, 4:46PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/occ-appr
oves-trust-charter-for-second-crypto-firm (Protego) [https://perma.cc/9W83-SBHA]. The
analysis contained herein should generally apply to those entities as well, as their charters are
national bank charters. Other crypto firms have received bank charters from state regulators.
See Patrick J. Boot & Marysia Laskowski, Wyoming Issues Second Crypto Bank Charter,
NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/wyoming-issues-seco
nd-crypto-bank-charter [https://perma.cc/24JZ-WHWG]. The analysis is different for these
firms because, as explained further in the state classification test section below, those firms
are defined as banks in the chartering state.
21. The OCC lost on the merits in 2019 to the NYDFS, but that decision was reversed
for lack of standing by the Second Circuit. See Lacewell v. Office of Comptroller of
Currency, No. 19-4271, (2d Cir. June 3, 2021), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/w
p-content/uploads/sites/14/2021/06/f1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P4P-AMBF]. If the OCC ever
grants a SPNB charter, the NYDFS is likely to reassert their claims.
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But even if the OCC’s decision to issue SPNB charters to fintech
companies is ultimately validated, it is not clear the rules the OCC intends to
apply to the resolution of these firms will ever be used. After all, the OCC’s
decision to label a non-depository entity a “bank” may not be recognized by
other regulators or by courts because the OCC intends to offer bank charters
to entities that are, at best, only bank-like. Like that contract law case that
bedevils law students with questions of “ . . . what is [a] chicken?,”22 whether
an entity is a “ . . . ‘bank’ is not self-evident. . . .”23
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section one
discusses various features of the OCC’s new fintech lending and payment
charters, including the purpose of the charter, which entities are eligible, the
advantages of a bank charter, and some of the concerns with the SPNB
charter. This section also discusses litigation over the OCC’s authority to
issue a SPNB charter.
Section two considers whether the OCC’s decision to issue a SPNB
charter to a fintech company would transform that entity into a bank for
bankruptcy purposes. As the term “bank” is not defined in the Bankruptcy
Code, this section focuses on the three judicially created tests for determining
whether an entity is a bank (and therefore ineligible for bankruptcy). The
two most commonly used tests to determine whether an entity is a bank for
Bankruptcy Code purposes—the state classification test and the independent
classification test—point in opposite directions. This section also analyzes
whether the definitions of “bank” from the Bank Holding Company Act and
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Act have bite in the context of SPNBs,
concluding that they do not.24 Thus, current doctrine cannot tell us whether
SPNBs are “banks” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
As a result, Section three explores some of the historic rationales for
excluding banks from bankruptcy to see if they justify excluding SPNBs
from bankruptcy. These rationales include most banks’ status as depository
institutions and the harm caused to depositors when banks close
unexpectedly, the fragility of banks and potential harm to the broader
economy when banks close unexpectedly, the existence of alternative
liquidation procedures, banks’ role in providing liquidity to the economy,
and several other rationales. This Article applies these rationales to the case
of an entity with a SPNB charter and concludes that most have little

22. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
23. Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the
History of Bank Holding Company Regulations in the United States, 31 REV. OF BANKING
AND FIN. L. 113, 115 (2011-2012).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 136-155.
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relevance. On balance then, this Article concludes that the policy case for
excluding OCC-chartered fintech companies—SPNBs—from bankruptcy is
a weak one, particularly for non-depository fintech lenders.
Finally, Section four explains why this conclusion matters to customers,
companies, and their financiers. It does so by highlighting the most salient
differences between bankruptcy and the OCC’s receivership processes. This
section also helps explain when and why bankruptcy is likely to be preferred
by a SPNB’s creditors or other stakeholders and when these parties are likely
to contest the OCC’s decision to initiate its new liquidation procedures for
SPNBs. For example, a SPNB’s creditors will prefer bankruptcy to the OCC
process when they think the entity would be more valuable after restructuring
its obligations instead of being liquidated, because bankruptcy is biased
towards reorganization and away from liquidation, but the OCC process is
primarily a liquidation process.25 A conclusion follows.
I.

THE OCC’S FINTECH CHARTER

The OCC has decided, on the basis of contested legal authority,26 to
offer national bank charters to entities that do not take FDIC-insured deposits
but instead merely lend money or facilitate payments.27 As the OCC
explained, “[a] national bank charter is a federal form of corporate
organization that authorizes a bank to conduct business on a nationwide basis
and subjects the bank to uniform standards and rigorous federal oversight.”28
For example, SPNBs will be subject to the same laws, rules, regulations,
and federal supervision that apply to all national banks, including the
minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements.29 The OCC will not

25. See infra text accompanying notes 239–241. That said, the OCC regulations appear
to allow for purchase and assumption transactions.
26. See Lacewell v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, No. 19-4271, (2d Cir. June 3,
2021), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2021/06/f1.p
df [https://perma.cc/2VQQ-9KYC]; see also Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 3 (“Congress’s 1978
amendment to Section 27(a) confirms that the NBA does not allow the OCC to approve
nondepository charters for national banks other than special-purpose trust companies.”).
27. See supra note 20.
28. See OCC, Exploring SPNB Charters, supra note 20, at 4 (“All national banks,
including special purpose national banks, are organized under, and governed by, the National
Bank Act.”).
29. See 12 C.F.R. Part 3; Comptroller’s Licensing Manual Supplement: Considering
Charter Applications From Financial Technology Companies, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY (2018), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/c
omptrollers-licensing-manual/files/considering-charter-apps-from-fin-tech-companies.html
[https://perma.cc/7AP8-ZBW6] (last accessed, Mar. 21, 2021) [hereinafter, Licensing
Supplement]; OCC, Exploring SPNB Charters, supra note 20, at 4 (“A special purpose
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grant a charter unless the proposed bank has complied with all statutory and
regulatory requirements and has met the OCC’s chartering standards.30 The
charter-seeking fintech entity must also demonstrate a commitment to
financial inclusion that includes providing or supporting fair access to
financial services and fair treatment of customers.31 And it must develop a
contingency plan to address significant financial stress that could threaten
the viability of the entity.32
To date, no entity has received a SPNB charter. The application process
for a SPNB charter is similar to the one used for other OCC bank charters.33
Importantly, the OCC has said that it would consider applications for SPNB
charters “ . . . from financial technology (fintech) companies that are
engaged in the business of banking but do not take deposits.”34 But it has
not defined what it means for an entity to “take deposits.” For fintech firms
that are primarily engaged in lending money to borrowers, it seems clear that
they do not take deposits because they are providing funding to borrowers
and not taking money from borrowers. By contrast, for fintech firms that are
primarily engaged in transmitting money between people—like CashApp,
Paypal, and Venmo—it is quite easy to argue that these firms take deposits,
at least in a colloquial sense.35 For example, Venmo has begun offering a

national bank may engage only in activities that are permissible for national banks . . . [and]
is subject to the same laws, regulations, examination, reporting requirements, and ongoing
supervision as other national banks.”).
30. The OCC’s chartering standards include that there is a reasonable chance that the
proposed bank will be operated in a safe and sound manner, provide fair access to financial
services, promote fair treatment of customers, and ensure compliance with applicable laws
and regulations. See Licensing Supplement, supra note 29. This does, of course, raise the
question of who would want a SPNB charter since it has most of the burdens of a regular bank
charter without the benefit of funding loans with low-cost deposits. See Brian Knight,
Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129,
200 (2017) (“If the OCC’s charter simply applies regulations built for universal banks to much
more limited companies, or if it otherwise imposes significant costs, it may be of little value
to new entrants that lack the resources to manage the associated regulatory burden.”).
31. See Licensing Supplement, supra note 29.
32. See Licensing Supplement, supra note 29.
33. See Licensing Supplement, supra note 29; OCC, Exploring SPNB Charters, supra
note 20, at 5
The OCC’s chartering regulation and licensing policies and procedures also
would apply to a special purpose national bank. The established charter policies
and procedures are set forth in 12 CFR Part 5 and the ‘Charters’ booklet of the
Comptroller’s Licensing Manual and are discussed in the Chartering process
section below.
34. See OCC, Policy Statement, supra note 19.
35. Cf. Andrés Guadamuz González, PayPal: The Legal Status of C2C Payment Systems,
COMP. L. AND SEC. REP. 293, 296 (2004) (explaining “Deposit has been defined by the
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debit card and it advertises that “Venmo Debit Card goes where you go, and
brings your Venmo balance along.”36 But for the reasons discussed further
below, these entities appear to share more similarities with money
transmitters than with banks.37
Fintech companies might consider applying for a SPNB charter to
obtain “ . . . the same status and attributes under federal law as a full-service
national bank,”38 because according to the OCC, an entity that obtains a
SPNB charter will be a national bank.39 Because national banks receive their
charter directly from the OCC (rather than from any particular state),40
Directive 94/19/EC as a credit balance that results from funds entered into an account and
which the credit institution must pay back” and arguing that Paypal is a “ . . . bank for all
regulatory purposes.”).
36. https://venmo.com/about/debitcard/ [https://perma.cc/6DHQ-ESNY].
37. See Madison Thompson, Money Transmitters Face Ambiguity In State, Federal Law,
Troutman Pepper (Dec. 4, 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/6324
80c8-9c16-4062-aaf9-9f8a256ba86a.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAVYILUYJ754JTDY6
T&Expires=1629143464&Signature=pxaNpuK1D5FvG%2BLFWz5Xl7hbnBk%3D [https:/
/perma.cc/R3H2-AN6E] (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5) (2018))
(A) A person that provides money transmission services. The term “money
transmission services” means the acceptance of currency, funds, or other value
that substitutes for currency from one person and the transmission of currency,
funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person
by any means. “Any means” includes, but is not limited to, through a financial
agency or institution; a Federal Reserve Bank or other facility of one or more
Federal Reserve Banks, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
or both; an electronic funds transfer network; or an informal value transfer
system. . . .
38. OCC, Exploring SPNB Charters, supra note 20, at 5.
39. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(1)(A) (defining a bank as “ . . . any national bank and State
bank, and any Federal branch and insured branch”).
40. See 12 U.S.C. § 21 through 12 U.S.C.S. § 95b, including 12 U.S.C. § 24 (providing
“Upon duly making and filing articles of association and an organization certificate
a national banking association shall become, as from the date of the execution of its
organization certificate, a body corporate, and as such, and in the name designated in the
organization certificate . . . “); see also 12 U.S.C. § 35 (discussing national banks that are a
bank “ . . . incorporated by special law of any State or of the United States or organized under
the general laws of any State or of the United States . . . “); Instructions – Articles of
Association, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ.gov/static/licens
ing/form-instruct-articles-assoc-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU9N-KXXV]; Licensing Manual:
Articles of Association, Charter, and Bylaw Amendments, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY (2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/com
ptrollers-licensing-manual/files/licensing-booklet-articles-of-assoc-charter-bylaw-amend.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/PN8T-LCZY]; Brief of Thirty-Three Banking Law Scholars as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellee, Lacewell v. OCC, at 23–24 [hereinafter Banking Law Scholars
Brief]; cf. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 219 (1997) (discussing Congress’ undisputed
power to, among other things, form national banks.); Boyd v. Schneider, 124 F. 239, 242
(N.D. Ill. 1903) (“National banks are the creatures of the national legislature.”).
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national banks have been called “ . . . the most significant exception . . . ” to
the “ . . . bedrock principle of American business law that corporate
formation and governance are the province of state, not federal, law.”41
National formation may have important implications for assessing whether
these entities will be treated like banks for bankruptcy’s purposes.42
There are at least three advantages of being a national bank.43 First, a
national bank need not comply with certain state licensing requirements. For
example, some states require that state-chartered banks operating within their
boundaries have a brick-and-mortar presence in that state.44 The ability to
avoid such requirements could be very attractive to non-depository fintech
companies, which often operate the bulk of their operations entirely online.45
41. Banking Law Scholars Brief, supra note 40, at 23–24.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 89–93.
43. A fourth potential advantage is that national banks may be able to gain access to
heavily subsidized loans from the Federal Reserve. And if an entity is granted access to such
loans, it increases the incentives for federal bank regulators to regulate those firms and thereby
protect the federal fisc. See Brian Knight, BankThink Fed Should Open the Payments System
to Fintechs, AM. BANKER (Jan. 24, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com
/opinion/fed-should-open-the-payments-system-to-fintechs [https://perma.cc/AE7Q-3XY9]
(highlighting the Federal Reserve’s reluctance to allow fintech companies
access to its payment system); Sabrina Chartrand, The OCC’s Step Towards Innovation: The
Fintech Charter, 38 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 511, 517 (2019); Barbara S. Mishkin, Fed
reported to have reservations about fintech charter, CONSUMER FINANCE MONITOR (Jan. 14,
2019), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2019/01/14/fed-reported-to-have-reserva
tions-about-fintech-charter/ [https://perma.cc/EU5G-XHKK] (“Federal Reserve officials
have expressed reservations about allowing such access to fintech companies.”).
44. Zaring, supra note 2, at 1451 (“Some states require a brick and mortar presence
before a state banking charter can be obtained, but fintech lenders have business plans
premised on the ability to avoid these sorts of institutional investments.”). This does not, by
itself, explain why they would want a SPNB charter instead of a traditional bank charter. In
Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, Brian Knight discusses some
rationales for justifying the federalization of banking policy. See Knight, Federalism and
Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, supra note 32, at 184-198. Curiously, some national
banks continue to comply with many state licensing laws even though those laws may be
preempted. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
national banks do not need state licenses to engage in lending). For example, Varo Bank—
which is among the first fintech lenders to hold a national bank charter (but not a SPNB
charter)—appears to have twenty-one active state lending licenses. See https://www.var
omoney.com/licenses/ [https://perma.cc/9RAJ-PDW3]. Perhaps Varo and other national
banks are just being good neighbors. But it might also be that the line between generally
applicable laws that national banks need to follow and preempted laws is not particularly
clear.
45. See Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of
Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 12–13 (2018) [hereinafter Bruckner, Promise and Perils]
(defining fintech lenders as non-bank financial companies that operate mostly online and use
non-traditional methods—such as Big Data and machine learning—to evaluate prospective
borrowers’ creditworthiness and market their products, sometimes to nontraditional
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Second, holders of SPNB charters may also be exempt from complying with
other state laws, including usury limits and certain fair lending laws, because
those laws would be preempted.46 Third, they can also reduce the number of
entities they report to by consolidating supervision under the OCC’s
authority.47 A variety of other rationales have also been proffered.48
Commentary on the SPNB charter has been mixed.
Some
commentators laud the OCC’s charter innovation, suggesting that some of
the companies that may pursue the SPNB charter are small fintech startups
bringing innovative new ideas to a stale and stodgy sector of the economy.49
In this view, fintech companies are small, scrappy upstarts disrupting the
banking orthodoxy. In addition, they suggest that it could disrupt the
business of banking if larger companies, such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
and Google, pursue a SPNB charter.50 In my own view, larger companies
are more likely to pursue bank charters than smaller ones because of the
compliance costs involved. That said, if Walmart’s experience in trying to
borrowers); see also Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Marketplace Lending,
69 ALA. L. REV. 781, 787–88 (2018) (offering a similar definition).
46. See Brief of the Center for Responsible Lending, National Consumer Law Center,
and National Community Reinvestment Coalition as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee,
Lacewell v. OCC, at 1–2 (“The foremost reason why nonbanks will seek out a ‘special
purpose national bank’ is to take advantage of preemption of state consumer protection laws,
particularly interest rate caps.”); see also Saule T. Omarova, Dealing with Disruption:
Emerging Approaches to Fintech Regulation, 61 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 25 (2020). Some
commentators think that this would be a problem. See, e.g., Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale
& Jennifer Chapman, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 499 (2019).
47. Zaring, supra note 2, at 1448 (“ . . . national charters offer the promise of a single
regulator and the possibility of a technically superior, if more expensive, form of
supervision.”); Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, supra note
30.
48. See Licensing Supplement, supra note 29. Another possible reason to get a SPNB
charter is to apply for access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window or to the special relief
facilities the Federal Reserve sometimes offers for institutions experiencing liquidity
problems. See Chartrand, supra note 43.
49. Zaring, supra note 2, at 1451 (explaining that fintech lenders and payments
companies would both be attracted to reducing their “ . . . licensing and regulatory cost[s] by
consolidating supervision under one primary national regulatory structure.”) (quoting U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES:
NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION, 71 (July 31, 2018), https://home.treasury
.gov/sites/default/files/2018-08/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities--Nonbank-Financials-Fintech-and-Innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/82VN-6XV8]).
50. Zaring, supra note 2, at 1452 (discussing the bank-like products offered by each of
these “most serious disrupters”); see also Donna Fuscaldo, Fintechs Will Have Some Big Tech
Competition In 2020, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2019, 9:18AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/donna
fuscaldo/2020/12/31/fintechs-will-have-some-big-tech-competition-in-2020/?sh=61dc78ae
44a8 [https://perma.cc/X83R-SECC].
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obtain a bank charter tells us anything, it is that it is not easy for some of the
world’s largest companies to obtain a bank charter.51 In other words, if any
entity successfully obtains a SPNB charter, it is likely to be larger than a tech
start up but smaller than the Walmarts of the world.
My view aligns with that of those commentators who have bemoaned
the possibility that the OCC’s decision could radically remake the U.S.
economy by inviting “ . . . much of the finance, insurance, and real estate
sector . . . into a federal charter.”52 These critics note that a SPNB charter
could, in theory, be available to “[p]ayment[s] processors, credit card
networks, investment advisers, hedge funds, private equity funds, securities
exchanges, derivatives clearinghouses, finance companies, payday lenders,
securitization vehicles, and mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts” and
that this would radically expand our idea of what it means to be a “bank.”53
Some of these worries have already come to pass.
Moreover, the NYSDFS and the CSBS have repeatedly sued the OCC,
claiming that the proposed charter oversteps the OCC’s chartering
authority.54 The OCC has successfully fended off litigation so far because
of plaintiff’s lack of standing, but further substantive litigation seems
exceedingly likely.55 However, the litigation over the fintech charter itself
may be causing some fintech companies to pursue traditional national bank
charters instead of the new SPNB charter.56 For example, Figure, Varo and

51. See Bernard Wysocki Jr., How Broad Coalition Stymied Wal-Mart’s Bid to Own a
Bank, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2006 12:01AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB11611849591
2296504 [https://perma.cc/J4ZV-F7F5].
52. Banking Law Scholars Brief, supra note 41, at 25.
53. Banking Law Scholars Brief, supra note 41, at 25–26.
54. See Zaring, supra note 2, at 1459 (noting state bank supervisors have opposed the
SPNB charter, but that the initial lawsuits were dismissed as premature); see also Lacewell
v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, No. 19-4271, (2d Cir. June 3, 2021), https://www.con
sumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2021/06/f1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z
V4-PF3J]; cf. Jeremy T. Rosenblum, James Kim & Scott A. Coleman, Conference of State
Bank Supervisors files new lawsuit to block OCC approval of Figure Technologies charter
application, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Jan. 5, 2021) (discussing various lawsuits by the
CSBS against the OCC related to charter applications), https://www.consumerfinancem
onitor.com/2021/01/05/conference-of-state-bank-supervisors-files-new-lawsuit-to-block-oc
c-approval-of-figure-technologies-charter-application/ [https://perma.cc/H83U-WARE].
55. See Lacewell v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, No. 19-4271, (2d Cir. June 3,
2021), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2021/06/f1.p
df [https://perma.cc/2Q5X-QZXA] (describing the various lawsuits the OCC successfully
defeated).
56. Though it is not clear that the SPNB charter was ever going to attract a lot of serious
interest. Other OCC charter innovations have only had a handful of takers. See, e.g., Zaring,
supra note 2, at 1463 (discussing various innovations in chartering, such as credit card banks
and trust charters, and noting there are only nine credit card banks and fifty-five trust chartered
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SoFi have all received at least preliminary approval for a traditional national
bank charter.57
But even if the OCC eventually grants a SPNB charter and prevails in
ligation likely to be brought by state banking supervisors, a host of potential
issues remain unanswered. Several of these issues revolve around how
creditors and other parties-in-interest would fare if a non-depository fintech
“bank” were to become financially distressed. Although the OCC has
approved a final rule to address the insolvency of uninsured national banks
in a receivership, those processes have never been used.58 And the rule is
sufficiently bare bones that there is substantial uncertainty about how it
would apply. In addition, an entity with a SPNB charter might prefer to use
bankruptcy. Whether a SPNB would be a “bank” for Bankruptcy Code
purposes is the question taken up next.
II.

ARE SPNBS “BANKS” FOR BANKRUPTCY PURPOSES?

The Bankruptcy Code excludes certain entities, including a “bank,
savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan association, . . . credit
union, or industrial bank or similar institution which is [a FDIC] insured
bank” from being a debtor in a bankruptcy case.59 Thus, whether a SPNB
would be eligible for bankruptcy depends on whether they are considered a
“bank.” And so, this Article asks, what is a bank? As Saule T. Omarova &
Margaret E. Tahyar write, “contrary to what most ordinary Americans may
think, what makes an institution a ‘bank’ is not self-evident and depends on
entities).
57. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Conditionally Approves SoFi’s
Application to Establish a National Bank, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (Oct.
28, 2020), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2020/nr-occ-2020-141.html
[https://perma.cc/WER6-VUPG]; Letter from Stephen A. Lybarger, Deputy Comptroller for
Licensing, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Paul Mayer, Vice President of
Strategy, Soc. Fin., Inc. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/
2020/nr-occ-2020-141a.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4Q9-PJ34]. https://uk.reuters.com/article/ussofi-bank-charter/fintech-startup-sofi-gets-preliminary-approval-for-u-s-bank-charter-idUK
KBN27D27W [https://perma.cc/RQA6-BB7J]; Acting Comptroller of the Currency Presents
Varo Bank, N.A. Its Charter, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (July 31, 2020),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2020/nr-occ-2020-99.html [https://
perma.cc/AL3W-LBB3] (approving Varo’s charter); Why Figure Applied for the US National
Bank Charter and What It Means for the Industry, FIGURE (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.figure
.com/blog/why-figure-applied-for-the-us-national-bank-charter-and-what-it-means-for-theindustry/ [https://perma.cc/KN97-P5SX].
58. Differences between the OCC’s new wind-down process for SPNBs and the
Bankruptcy Code are described more fully in the attached Appendix and some of the key
differences are discussed in Part IV.
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2).
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whether the statute defines it as such.”60 Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Code
does not define these terms. While the OCC may consider a SPNB to be a
bank, bankruptcy judges are not bound to agree.61 And, for the reasons set
forth in this section, this Article argues that they are not likely to agree.62
It’s true, as the OCC wrote, that there are no opinions “of a U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, or any other U.S. court, finding that an uninsured national
bank is eligible to be a debtor subject to a petition under the Code.”63
However, the lack of decisions highlighted by the OCC does not support a
conclusion that uninsured national banks are not eligible for bankruptcy,
especially considering how few uninsured national banks have been wound
down.64 And, courts have found determined that uninsured state-chartered
banks are bankruptcy-eligible.65
For example, in In re Colo. Indus. Bank of Fort Collins, the court
allowed an uninsured, Colorado-chartered industrial bank to remain in
bankruptcy. The Colorado State Bank Commissioner had sought to dismiss
the entity’s chapter 11 petition,66 arguing that the entity was a bank within
60. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 23, at 115.
61. Although this exact issue does not appear to have arisen previously, an analogous
problem has arisen in the case of business trusts. In that case, the court determined that “the
weight of authority” cuts against deference to the chartering entity. Compare In re EHT US1
Inc., 21-10036 at *20 (Bankr. D. Del. June 1, 2021) (citing Butner for the proposition that the
court should look to the law of an entity’s incorporation—Singapore in this case—to
determine if the entity is the type of trust eligible for bankruptcy relief) with Catholic Sch.
Emps. Pension Tr. v. Abreu (In re Catholic Sch. Emps. Pension Tr., 599 B.R. 634, 654 (1st
Cir. B.A.P. 2019) (“there is consensus that federal law should govern the determination of
eligibility for trusts”). See also infra text accompanying notes 106-107.
62. Congress could, of course, change the rules of the road and specifically exclude
SPNBs from bankruptcy. Congress’ creation of the Orderly Liquidation Authority in 2010
via the Dodd-Frank Act may signal lawmakers belief that bankruptcy is not well-suited to
address the financial distress of bank-like financial companies.
63. 81 Fed. Register 92597 (Dec. 20, 2016), https://thefederalregister.org/81-FR/Issue244/FR-2016-12-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7KH-5VUE].
64. For example, there have never been very many non-depository credit card banks, and
none of them appear to have been a debtor in a bankruptcy case. See Zaring, supra note 2, at
1463. Members of the Conseco corporate family used bankruptcy, but not their banking
subsidiary, Conseco Bank, Inc., which was a so-called credit card bank.
65. See RECEIVERSHIPS FOR UNINSURED NATIONAL BANKS, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, supra note 13, at *10 n.4; In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 646 (1935); In re Colo. Indus. Bank of Fort Collins, 84 B.R. 735, 738–40
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); cf. First Am. Bank & Tr. Co. v. George, 540 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1976).
66. See 84 B.R. 735, 737 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (“This matter comes before the Court
on the motion of the Colorado State Bank Commissioner requesting that the Court dismiss or
abstain from hearing the petition filed by the Colorado Industrial Bank of Fort Collins for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.”); see also In re Bankwest Boulder Indus.
Bank, 82 B.R. 559 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (denying the Colorado State Bank Commissioner
and United States Trustee’s motion to dismiss the chapter 11 case of debtor, Bankwest
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the meaning of section 109(b)(2) because it “has the right to accept savings
deposits and make installment loans.”67 The court disagreed, holding that
debtor was an uninsured industrial bank because “unlike state chartered
commercial banks and national banks, the debtor is prohibited from carrying
demand bank accounts.”68 Because only FDIC-insured industrial banks are
specifically made ineligible for bankruptcy relief,69 the court held that there
is “no justification to classify this debtor as anything other than an entity
which is eligible for Bankruptcy Code protection.”70 In other words, the
court engaged in straight-forward statutory interpretation. In addition, the
court did not agree with the “Commissioner’s contention that
the Colorado Industrial Bank of Fort Collins should not be a debtor in the
bankruptcy court [because of] the existence of a Colorado statutory scheme
for either liquidating or reorganizing this industrial bank . . . .”71
In summary, once Colo. Indus. Bank of Fort Collins filed for
bankruptcy, Colorado’s state banking regulator could not wrest control away
from the bankruptcy court even though the relevant state statute gave the
Commissioner “ . . . full and exclusive power and control . . . to manage the
affairs and liquidate an industrial bank.”72 And courts have also allowed
bankruptcy cases to be filed even after state banking supervisors initiate
liquidation proceedings against the entity. For example, in In re Prudence,
three creditors of the debtor filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition under
the Bankruptcy Act shortly after “the superintendent of banks of the state of
New York . . . took possession of the property and business of the Prudence
Company, Inc. [the debtor].”73 There, the Second Circuit declined to force
the bankruptcy court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. In other words,
creditors of an entity in an administrative wind-down process found it
advantageous to have the bankruptcy court affirmatively wrest control over
Boulder Industrial Bank, because the debtor was neither a bank nor an FDIC-insured industrial
bank within the meaning of section 109(b)(2)).
67. 84 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (discussing that having the right to accept
savings deposits and make installment loans would bring an entity within the generally used
definition of banks used by the BHCA, but pointing out that certain industrial loan companies
are specifically excepted from that definition); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H)(ii); cf.
Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 23, at 160–61 (discussing industrial loan companies and the
reasons they are excepted from the definition of bank in the BHCA).
68. 84 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (stating ineligible entities include an “industrial bank or
similar institution which is an insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act . . . “).
70. 84 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
71. Id. at 737.
72. In re Bankwest Boulder Indus. Bank, 82 B.R. 559, 564 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
73. In re Prudence, 79 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1935).
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the proceeding away from the entity’s primary regulator.74
While a Bankruptcy Court might defer to the OCC’s decision to label
fintech companies “national banks,” there are many reasons to doubt that
they will. And this is particularly true for non-depository fintech lenders.
Federal judges, including most bankruptcy judges to address the issue, have
held that an essential element of being a bank is “the power to receive
deposits.”75 For example, in recent litigation over the OCC’s power to issue
SPNB charters, Judge Victor Marrero wrote that “the term ‘business of
banking,’ as used in the [National Bank Act], unambiguously requires
federally chartered institutions to accept deposits.”76
And most
commentators agree.77 Yet, fintech lenders almost surely do not take
deposits no matter how deposit-taking is defined. And while some fintech
payment processors may take deposits (at least in the colloquial sense), most
fintech payment processors are likely to be categorized as money
transmitters and not banks under state law.78 In any case, though, deposittaking alone is not dispositive.79
74. Id. at 80 (describing it as “well settled that the appointment of receivers for a
corporation does not deprive its directors of the power to file a petition in bankruptcy”).
75. See id. at 79–80 (discussing the consensus among courts construing the words
“‘banking corporation,’ as used in the Bankruptcy Act,” that “the legal power to receive
deposits [is] the essential thing”) (citing Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir.
1930); State of Kansas v. Hayes, 62 F.2d 597, 598 (10th Cir. 1932); Clemons v. Liberty Sav.
& Real Est. Corp., 61 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1932); and Woolsey v. Sec. Tr. Co., 74 F.2d
334, 337 (5th Cir. 1932)); see also In re Bankwest Boulder Indus. Bank, 82 B.R. at 564 (calling
demand bank accounts (i.e., checking accounts) “a recognized hallmark of a true banking
institution”). But see In re Trade Fin. Bank, 163 B.R. 558, 563 (Bankr. S.D. 1994) (“Although
the power to receive deposits may be a critical factor in some states’ classification of banks,
it may not be in others.”).
76. Lacewell v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, No. 18-8377, 2019 WL 6334895, at
*38 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019), rev’d on other grounds by Lacewell v. Office of Comptroller
of Currency, No. 19-4271, (2d Cir. June 3, 2021), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com
/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2021/06/f1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W6P-N6UF].
77. See, e.g,, Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 3 (arguing “that the NBA does not allow the
OCC to approve nondepository charters for national banks other than special-purpose trust
companies”); see also Banking Law Scholars Brief, supra note 40, at 31. But see Brief of
Professor David Zaring as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency and Joseph Otting, Lacewell v. OCC, at 7 (writing that there are many
chartered institutions that do not take deposits (including trust banks and credit card banks
chartered by the OCC) and claiming that there are “[a]lmost no cases have held that firms
must take deposits if they want to obtain a bank charter”).
78. See supra note 37.
79. See In re Republic Tr. & Sav. Co., 59 B.R. at 613 (“An entity cannot be a bank if it
lacks the power to receive deposits (although it may still not be a bank even if it has the power
to receive deposits).”); see also In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d at 79 (holding that the entity was
not a bank even though “the state has so classified it by permitting it to be incorporated under
the Banking Law, subjecting it to supervision by the superintendent of banks, and providing
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Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define “bank, savings bank,
cooperative bank, savings and loan association, . . . credit union, or industrial
bank or similar institution which is [a FDIC] insured bank . . . ,”80 courts have
used at least three tests to determine what these terms mean: the state
classification test, the independent classification test, and the alternative
relief test. Although these tests have not been carefully delineated in
practice,81 in the three following subsections this Article will apply the three
judicially crafted tests to the question of whether an entity with a SPNB
charter constitutes a bank. It will also consider the policies underlying the
definitions of bank in the Bank Holding Company Act (the BHCA) and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (the FDIA) to consider whether courts will
borrow from those statutes to aid in their analysis.82
To highlight my conclusion, bankruptcy judges are likely to conclude
that SPNBs are not banks. The state classification test points towards
affirming the OCC’s view that SPNBs are “banks” and are ineligible for
bankruptcy. However, the other two tests counsel in favor of bankruptcy
eligibility for SPNBs, particularly for fintech lenders.83 Finally, the policies
underlying the BHCA and the FDIA are so different from the Bankruptcy
Code that a SPNB’s status under either law is not particularly relevant to the
question of a SPNB’s status under the Code.84
A.

The state classification test

The state classification test is often considered the predominant test for
determining whether an entity is a bank.85 There are only a few cases that

a procedure by which the said superintendent might take it over for liquidation”).
80. See supra note 59.
81. While courts have described three different tests for determining whether an entity is
a bank—the state classification, independent classification, and alternative relief tests—these
courts often do not apply the tests in the same manner. For example, while many courts label
their inquiry as “independent classification,” some courts use this label to refer to the
traditional role of statutory interpretation, while others use this label when they are
considering legislative policy objectives. But other courts use the “alternative relief” label
when they are reviewing legislative policy. In other words, the doctrinal labels are not
universally agreed upon.
82. See infra, text accompanying notes 136-155.
83. See infra, text accompanying notes 110-167.
84. Even if the laws were more directly relevant as an analogy, they lead to different
conclusions. See infra, text accompanying notes 136-155.
85. Unfortunately, the case law in this area can be confusing because courts often use the
same label to refer to different sets of inquiries, though this is truer for the other two tests than
of the state classification test.
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have addressed the meaning of “bank” as used in the Bankruptcy Code,86 but
there are many cases that used the state classification test to analyze similar
language from the Bankruptcy Act.87 For example, in interpreting the
Bankruptcy Act the Second Circuit wrote that if a state “classes the company
as a bank or a railroad or an insurer, that too should be authoritative.”88
The “state classification test” emphasizes “the categorization, status
and operations of an entity under nonbankruptcy [i.e., state] law.”89 If
nonbankruptcy (usually state) law treats the entity as a bank,90 the state
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2); see also In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp., 59 B.R. 978
(E.D. Tenn. 1986) (describing the “relatively few cases interpreting § 109(b)(2) and its
predecessors”). In fact, only the Seventh Circuit appears to have endorsed the use of the state
classification test in this specific context, although the Sixth circuit has embraced it in the
context of other terms in section 109. In re Cash Currency Exchange, Inc., 762 F.2d 542, 548
(7th Cir. 1985); Ky. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Seven Cntys. Servs., Inc., 901 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2017)
(discussing the state classification test for the definition of municipality). There are only a
handful of district court cases as well. See, e.g., In re Oil & Gas Ins. Co. 1992 WL 308033
(C.D. Ca., July 31, 1991).
87. See, e.g., First Am. Bank & Tr. Co. v. George, 540 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing
cases from the 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 10th circuits).
88. In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d at 79.
89. In re Republic Tr. & Sav. Co., 59 B.R. at 611; see Sovern, supra note 7, at 182
Three kinds of state action have been urged upon the courts as warranting a
holding that a given corporation is exempt from bankruptcy, and hence to be left
to the state of incorporation for liquidation or reorganization. These are: (1) that
the state of incorporation has provided for liquidation or reorganization of
corporations of this type; (2) that the state of incorporation has declared that
corporations of this type shall not be subject to the Bankruptcy Act; and (3) that
the of incorporation has classified corporations of this type as banking or
insurance corporations or building and loan associations. The first and second
points are usually raised to bolster the third.
90. This classification can be explicit or implicit. The implicit state classification test is
usually referred to as the substantial equivalent test. See, e.g., In re Auto. Pros., Inc., 370
B.R. 161, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (“Under the state classification test, if the court
concludes that [an entity] is not classified as [a bank] under state law, the court must then
analyze whether [the entity] is the substantial equivalent of [a bank] under state law.”) (citing
In re Est. of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d 436, 442 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Patrick Collins,
HMO Eligibility for Bankruptcy: The Case for Federal Definitions of 109(b)(2) Entities, 2
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 425, 435 (1994) (“Entities are deemed to be substantial equivalents
of entities excluded under section 109(b)(2) if the former share certain essential attributes or
powers with the latter”). Under a substantial equivalent analysis, courts tend to consider four
factors: “(1) whether the debtor has the essential attributes of [a bank]; (2) the degree of state
regulation of the debtor; (3) the existence of a state statutory scheme for liquidation or
rehabilitation, and (4) the public or quasi-public nature of the business.”) In re Auto. Pros.,
Inc., 370 B.R. at 176 (citing In re Est. of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d at 445); see also Matter of
Cash Currency Exchange, Inc., 762 F.2d 542, 548 (7th Cir. 1985)
The starting point in this analysis is a comparison of the powers conferred upon
or withheld from the entity with the powers conferred upon or withheld from
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classification test is satisfied and many bankruptcy courts will defer (almost)
entirely to the debtor’s treatment under applicable nonbankruptcy law.91 For
example, the district court in In re Republic Financial Corp. found that the
entity in question was not a bank because it
was not chartered as a bank as required under Oklahoma law nor
was it registered as a bank with the Oklahoma Banking
Commission or authorized to engage in the banking business. RTS
was chartered as a trust company, not as a bank. RTS was not
authorized under Oklahoma law to engage in the banking
business.92
In most cases, the state classification test looks at the debtor’s treatment
in the state of its incorporation.93 Deference to state law has been thought
appropriate because Congress’ “apparent purpose [was] to leave the winding
up of such companies to the state.”94 Courts have generally suggested that
the primary reason to defer to states has been the public interest in protecting
bank creditors, primarily depositors.95 But in an article thoroughly reviewing
the legislative history and case law surrounding the provisions excluding
banks from bankruptcy, Professor Michael Sovern makes plain that

entities excluded under section 109(b)(2). The court also will examine the
relevant statute to determine whether the entity, like those in the excluded class,
is subject to extensive state regulation; is subject to express statutory procedures
for liquidation or rehabilitation; and conducts business of a public or quasi-public
nature.
(citing First Am. Bank & Tr. Co., 540 F.2d at 349).
91. Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass’n, 129 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1942) (“The course of decisions,
even in the Second Circuit, where perhaps the rule of state classification has been most
strongly stated, indicates that the spirit rather than the letter of the local statutes should
prevail.”).
92. In re Republic Fin. Corp. 77 B.R. 282, 284 (N.D. Okla. 1987) (“Therefore, RFC and
RTS should not be classified as banks under the Oklahoma Banking Code.”).
93. Collins, supra note 90, at 432–33.
94. In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d at 79.
95. In re Republic Fin. Corp., 77 B.R. at 284; see also Collins, supra note 90, at 440
(noting several justifications for the state classification test, including:
the absence of statutory definitions for the entities listed in section 109(b)(2);
legislative history indicating that entities are excluded under section 109(b)(2)
because alternate provisions for their liquidation or rehabilitation exist under state
law; an established judicial practice of looking to state law to fill gaps in the
Code; and finally a codified federal policy of non-interference with state
regulation of the business of insurance.
Collins, supra note 90, at 446 (“The overriding interest underlying state insolvency regulation
of excluded entities is to protect consumers of these industries.”).
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Congress’ rationale for deferring to state law is not particularly clear.96 He
offers several possible rationales to defer to state definitions,97 including the
existence of alternative liquidation regimes,98 extensive state-based
regulation,99 and a Congressional desire to defer to existing state
definitions.100 Sovern also rejects some common rationales, such as the
existence of state supervision and the need for local control, as being unlikely

96. See generally Sovern, supra note 7. Another terrific article on this subject is Paul J.
Green, When a Bank Is Not a Bank, 43 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 910 (1976) (noting that courts
have identified a variety of alternative rationales, including: “(1) ‘the public or quasi-public
nature’ of the banking business, which is tied to other interests beyond the lending function;
(2) ‘the desirability of unarrested operation’ of banks; and (3) ‘the inappropriateness of the
bankruptcy machinery’ for winding up the affairs of banks”).
97. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 7, at 181
It is possible, too, that Congress had no more definite reason than a reluctance to
bring such crucial financial institutions within the purview of a statute aimed
primarily at liquidation, but preferred to leave them under the aegis of the states
and to courts of equity, where rehabilitation would at least be a possibility.
Sovern, supra note 7, at 187–91 (suggesting that the state classification test might be justified
on grounds that it is a bright-line rule and that “[p]redictability alone may be sufficient to
justify the state classification test”); Green, supra note 96, at 910; Peter P. Swire, Bank
Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L. J. 471, 505 (1992) (“The existence
of special bank insolvency rules was founded on the perceived problem of bank runs and
depositors’ need to have immediate access to transaction accounts.”).
98. Sovern, supra note 7, at 175; Green, supra note 96, at 907–08 (quoting one of the
authors of the original language excluding national banks from bankruptcy access as
explaining, “[t]here is already in existence a satisfactory law for the control and liquidation
of national banks. Since the Government is responsible for the bank notes issued by these
banks in the event of their failure, there is good reason why it should have control of their
liquidation”).
99. Sovern, supra note 7, at 181, 204
If we accept the common judicial rationale that Congress’ purpose was to leave
the insolvency administration of strictly regulated enterprises to the state which
regulates them, the sound approach would be to resolve all close cases in favor
of exclusion from bankruptcy if the corporation is strictly regulated, and against
exclusion in the absence of strict regulation.
Green, supra note 96, at 906–07 (writing that there is substantial support in the legislative
history that banks should be excluded from the “generic provisions of the Bankruptcy Act”
because “Congress and the various state legislatures had enacted highly specialized regulatory
devices which included liquidation procedures, [and] those tailored schemes should be
allowed to operate . . . ”).
100. Sovern, supra note 7, at 185-86 (arguing that Congress’s failure to define a term does
not evidence its intent “to accept the definition of whatever state happened to be the state of
incorporation of a particular debtor”); Green, supra note 96, at 914 (noting that the Second
Circuit has held “that the only operative intent behind the banking corporation exclusion was
the avoidance of conflict between state or federal regulatory procedures and the Bankruptcy
Act”) (citing Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. FDIC, 536 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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to be determinative.101
National banks are chartered directly by the OCC and the OCC takes
the position that SPNBs are “banks.”102 As the OCC explained, “[a] national
bank charter is a federal form of corporate organization that authorizes a
bank to conduct business on a nationwide basis and subjects the bank to
uniform standards and rigorous federal oversight.”103 Thus, if a court looks
to the OCC’s classification they are likely to treat SPNBs as banks for
bankruptcy purposes.
But will they? As just detailed, courts and commentators have offered
a variety of rationales for deference to the views of the incorporating entity.
Of the rationales Professor Sovern offers, the existence of an alternative

101. Sovern, supra note 7, at 177, 185
But since there is little evidence in the legislative history to support the
proposition that close state regulation was the principal reason for Congress’
action, and since Congress, instead of excepting from bankruptcy all corporations
which the states may strictly regulate, excepted only a handful of such companies,
the ultimate responsibility for distinguishing those companies from all others
rests on the federal courts.
see also Green, supra note 96, at 915–16 (arguing that federalism concerns are the most likely
rationale for the exclusion of banks from bankruptcy).
102. See OCC, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH
COMPANIES, (Dec. 2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/ban
ker-education/files/exploring-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech-companies.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/X4QW-KPVK]; see also Letter from John W. Ryan, President and CEO,
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, to Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.csbs.org/sites/defaul
t/files/2017-11/CSBS%20Comment%20Letter%20on%20OCC%20Receiverships%20fo
r%20Uninsured%20National%20Banks%20NPRM_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ5K-5LUP]
[hereinafter, CSBS Letter] (The Conference of State Bank supervisors has taken the view that
SPNBs “would remain eligible to file for bankruptcy in a liquidation or reorganization
proceeding” and sought guidance from regulators as to how its framework “would interact
with conflicting bankruptcy law and the rights accorded debtors and creditors under such
law”); Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, 81 Fed. Reg. 92594 (proposed Sept. 13,
2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 51), https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2016-30666/p-25
[https://perma.cc/H7QN-5GF4] (III. Public Comments on the Proposed Rule)
The OCC believes it is best to be clear, through a regulation implementing those
NBA provisions, about the framework that would apply in order to avoid
clouding the ongoing discussion about the chartering of special purpose national
banks engaged in fintech activities with uncertainty about how uninsured
institutions are resolved . . . The OCC continues to consider what approach to
assessments would be appropriate should it approve charters for special purpose
national banks engaged in fintech activities.
103. See OCC, Exploring SPNB Charters, supra note 20, at 4 (“All national banks,
including special purpose national banks, are organized under, and governed by, the National
Bank Act.”).
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liquidation regime is the only one that counsels in favor of adopting the
OCC’s views.104 By contrast, the lack of a well-formed regulatory structure
and Congress’s failure to express a desire to defer to the OCC’s interpretation
counsels against.105 The answer seems, at best, uncertain.
In a somewhat analogous context involving a business trust a conflict
between federal and Singaporean law, at least one court applied non-federal
law to resolve the definitional dispute. In In re EHT US1 Inc., the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware applied Singaporean law in
deciding that an offshore real estate investment trust was a “business trust”
eligible for chapter 11.106 In doing so it disagreed with “the weight of
authority,” which instead applies federal common law for the sake of
uniformity.107
The state classification test is often described as the alpha and omega
of courts’ analysis.108 Some courts use only this test and no other. Therefore,
it remains possible that a court would defer to the OCC’s view of SPNBs and
find that SPNBs are ineligible for bankruptcy if it ended its inquiry there.
However, courts often employ the independent classification test in
conjunction with the state classification test. In the second stage, courts
“must then consider whether the state classification is consistent with the

104.. Sovern, supra note 7, at 175; see also Green, supra note 96, at 907-08.
105. Sovern, supra note 7, at 181, 185-86, 204; see also Green, supra note 96, at 906-07;
cf. Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, Federal Corporate Law and the Business of Banking, 88
U. CHI. L. REV. *19 (forthcoming 2021), (from the November 2020 version on file with
author) (discussing how the Supreme Court directed lower courts to use a “location-based
approach” for determining the fiduciary duties for directors of federally chartered depository
institutions by looking to the state laws in the place where “the federally chartered bank has
its main office or maintains its principal place of business”).
106. 21-10036 (Bankr. D. Del. June 1, 2021); see also Bill Rochelle, Federal Common
Law Doesn’t Define a Business Trust Eligible for Chapter 11, Rochelle’s Daily Wire (June 8,
2021), https://www.abi.org/newsroom/daily-wire/federal-common-law-doesn%E2%80%99t
-define-a-business-trust-eligible-for-chapter-11 [https://perma.cc/AD6L-QJKE] (applying
Singaporean law in deciding a REIT’s chapter 11 eligibility).
107. 21-10036 (Bankr. D. Del. June 1, 2021); cf. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 224
(1997) (discussing whether federal common law should control the fiduciary duties applicable
to directors and officers of federally chartered banks because there is no law from the state of
incorporation to look to).
108. Collins, supra note 90, at 434–35; see also First Am. Bank & Tr. Co., 540 F.2d at 346
(“(The) authorities establish the rule that in determining whether a corporate debtor is a
member of the excepted classes, the provisions of the state law must be given predominating
influence.”) (citing cases from the 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 10th circuits); but cf. Sims v. Fidelity
Assur. Ass’n, 129 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1942) (“The course of decisions, even in the Second
Circuit, where perhaps the rule of state classification has been most strongly stated, indicates
that the spirit rather than the letter of the local statutes should prevail.”).
108. See, e.g., In re Republic Tr. & Sav. Co., 59 B.R. at 611.
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purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”109 This inquiry is discussed in the next
subsection.
B. The independent classification test
While some courts suggest that the state classification test is
preeminent, many courts also regularly invoke the independent classification
test.110 Unhelpfully, while many courts label their inquiry as the independent
classification test, they do not always mean the same thing. Some courts
consider the independent classification test “merely another name for
judicial interpretation and construction of the statute,” an essential judicial
role.111 Many of these courts have been particularly critical of the state
classification test and its suggestion that federal courts interpreting federal
law should defer to state legislatures and state agencies to define when
federal courts should hear a case.112 But other courts use the independent
109. In re Auto. Pros., Inc., 370 B.R. at 167 (citing In re Est. of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d
at 442).
110. Nearly every court to consider both the state classification and independent
classification test have reached the same conclusion using both tests. But Professor Sovern
argued (in 1957) if the entity was not empowered to receive deposits, it would not be held to
be a bank regardless of how it was classified under state law. Sovern, supra note 7, at 206,
n.123.
111. See, e.g., In re Republic Tr. & Sav. Co., 59 B.R. at 611 (stating “The ‘state
classification test’ was somewhat illusory, for no State scheme could override Congress’ own
intention as to who should be eligible for bankruptcy relief; and the ‘independent
classification test’ was merely another name for judicial interpretation and construction of the
statute.”); In re Northern Mariana Islands Retirement Fund, 2012 WL 8654317 (D.N.M.I.
2012) (arguing in favor or using the independent classification test alone because section 109
contains statutory terms and it is
[t]he court’s job . . . to interpret those terms. The “three tests” suggest that courts
must interpret those terms using unique techniques. But no one has explained
why the usual tools of statutory construction are inadequate or inapplicable. The
[alternative relief] test is particularly suspect, because it is completely unmoored
from the statutory text.
see also In re Family Health Services, Inc., 104 B.R. 268, 273 (Bankr. C.D. Ca 1989)
(describing its ruling as “entirely consistent” with a 9th circuit case that described the state
classification test as dispositive, despite applying the traditional rules of statutory construction
to decide the issue); Sovern, supra note 7, at 185 (explaining that courts rarely examine the
underlying basis for employing the state classification test).
112. In re Colo. Indus. Bank, 84 B.R. at 738 n.2; cf. Collins, supra note 90, at 443 (“It
seems unlikely that Congress intended to delegate to the states to decide, even if limited to
the banking and insurance industries, who shall have access to federal bankruptcy courts.”);
In re Auto. Pros., Inc., 370 B.R. at 179–80 (quoting California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987)) (“States cannot undermine Congressional intent by broadly
classifying entities that are not [banks] as [banks]. Federal law preempts state law if it ‘stands
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classification test label to describe their focus on federal bankruptcy policy,
warning that they are charged with ensuring “that the results of the state
classification analysis do not defeat federal bankruptcy policy.”113 Whatever
the reason, many courts use the independent classification test label to
describe their inquiry and some have even argued this is the preeminent
test.114 In this section, this Article considers both types of independent
classification inquiries.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the statutory language is
the starting place for statutory interpretation.115 As a result, we might expect
that courts would embrace the independent classification test, which requires
that “bankruptcy courts construe section 109(b)(2) itself based upon their
own definition of the words of the Bankruptcy Code.”116 Only the
independent classification test, therefore, puts “Congressional intent, as
evinced by the language of the statute itself or by legislative history,” on the
center stage.117
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”); In re Republic Tr. & Sav. Co., 59 B.R. at 611; Sovern, supra note 7, at 183–84
(suggesting that some courts have thought they were bound to defer to a state’s classification
because they believe that Congress has indicated that it wants them to do so) (quoting In re
Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., 75 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1935)).
113. In re Auto. Pros., Inc., 370 B.R. at 180 (finding that entity is bankruptcy eligible, and
that state interest doesn’t require adjudication by state laws because “[t]o put Illinois’ relative
stake in perspective, less than 5% of API’s outstanding service contracts are held by Illinois
residents. Thus, applying the Bankruptcy Code in this case carries out Congress’ intent to
create a single uniform bankruptcy system that will apply to a debtor’s activities in every
state”). Some courts use the “alternative relief test” label to describe what they are doing
when they consider bankruptcy policy. See infra text accompanying note 156.
114. See Sovern, supra note 7, at 186 n.61 (claiming “the weight of authority favored
independent characterization over acceptance of a state classification” and citing cases);
Sovern, supra note 7, at 206 n.123 (“[N]o banking decision has considered its independent
characterization to be at variance with a state classification.”); see also Collins, supra note
90, at 443 (describing the state classification test).
115. See, e.g., Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534-39 (2004) (“When the
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the court[] . . . is to enforce it according to its
terms.”) (internal quotation omitted).
116. Cent. Mortg. & Tr., Inc. v. State of Texas ex rel. Sexton and Wynne (In re Cent. Mortg.
& Tr., Inc.), 50 B.R. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1985); see also In re Republic Tr. & Sav. Co., 59 B.R.
at 613 (construing § 109 exemption); In re Republic Fin. Corp., 77 B.R. at 283 (“The second
test for § 109 exemption is referred to as the “independent classification test” whereby the
court, on its own, construes § 109.”); Sovern, supra note 7, at 186 n.61.
117. Collins, supra note 90, at 440; Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994);
Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534–39 (2004); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 474
(2015)
If the statutory language is plain, the Court must enforce it according to its terms.
But oftentimes the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may
only become evident when placed in context [;] . . . the Court must read the words
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Applying the independent classification test to SPNBs is likely to result
in courts finding that such entities are not “banks” within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code.118 In 1933, the Tenth Circuit explained that “[c]alling an
institution a bank does not make it a bank in legal contemplation if it is not
given the powers of a bank.”119 A core banking power is the power to take
deposits,120 with Professor Sovern going so far as to write that “whatever the
classification of the state of incorporation, it seems unlikely that a
corporation will be held a bank if it lacks the power to receive deposits.”121
Almost universally, courts agree, including all of the circuit courts to
consider the issue.122 As the Second Circuit explained in Prudence: “Strictly
speaking the term bank implies a place for the deposit of money, as that is
the most obvious purpose of such an institution.”123 Similarly, the Eighth
Circuit has written that “while there may be other attributes which a bank
may possess, yet a necessary one is the receipt of deposits which it may use
in its business.”124 More recent decisions have continued to require deposit-

in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
118. This is almost certainly true for fintech lenders but is less clearly correct for fintech
payment processors. See infra text accompanying note 132.
119. Hayes, 62 F.2d at 600; see also In re Republic Fin. Corp., 77 B.R. at 284 (“[A]n
entity cannot be a bank unless it is authorized to do banking business.”); In re Southern Indus.
Banking Corp. 59 B.R. 978 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (“The Court considers that the word ‘bank’ as
it appears in § 109(b)(2) without a qualifying adjective, refers to a commercial bank.”).
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l) defines “deposit” in a fairly circular fashion. Essentially it
provides that deposits can only be held by banks or savings associations, even though the
actions it describes as deposit-taking are conducted by a wide range of entities.
121. Sovern, supra note 7, at 206; Id. at 192 (citing several cases which found deposittaking was a necessary but not sufficient condition to be a bank, and stating “A corporation
cannot be a banking corporation within the meaning of section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act unless
it has the power to receive deposits.”); see also Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 3 (“Federal courts
have repeatedly identified deposit-taking as an “essential” aspect of the “business of banking”
authorized by the NBA and other federal statutes.”).
122. In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d at 79–80; Clemons v. Liberty Savings & Real Estate
Corp., 61 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1932); In re Cash Currency Exchange, Inc., 762 F.2d 542 (7th
Cir. 1985)); Hayes, 62 F.2d at 598; Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir.
1932); Gamble, 39 F.2d at 447.
123. In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d at 79 (quoting Oulton v. German Savings & Loan Soc.,
84 U.S. 109, 118 (1872)); see also In re Cash Currency Exchange, 762 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that currency exchanges that did not accept deposits were not “banks” and
were not exempted from the Bankruptcy Code, based on cases decided under the 1898
Bankruptcy Act); Sovern, supra note 7, at 191 (noting that a court using the independent
classification test must come up with its own definition for bank).
124. Gamble, 39 F.2d at 450; see also Frank R. Kennedy, The Commencement of a Case
under the New Bankruptcy Code, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 990 (1979) (noting that
deposit-taking was “the crucial question” under the Bankruptcy Act, that deposit-taking was
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taking as essential to the definition of a bank. For example, in In re Republic
Financial Corp.,125 the district court noted that “an entity cannot be a bank
unless it is authorized to do banking business . . . [and t]he power to accept
general deposits is an essential attribute of a bank.”126
According to the OCC, SPNBs are, by definition, non-depository
institutions.127 In a policy statement, the OCC announced that it was
accepting “applications for special purpose national bank charters from
financial technology (fintech) companies that are engaged in the business of
banking but do not take deposits.”128 The OCC’s decision to issue bank
charters to non-depository institutions should not, therefore, transform
SPNBs into banks for purposes of section 109(b)(2).129 Many eminent
banking law scholars agree, writing that “[n]ondepository national banks
would not be considered ‘banks’ under [the independent classification]
test.”130 Other banking regulators, such as the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, also concur in this assessment, writing to that “the power to
necessary but not dispositive by itself, and suggesting that “[w]hether or not a debtor receives
deposits is likely to continue to be significant in determining whether a debtor is one of the
three varieties of excluded banks under the Bankruptcy Code”).
125. In re Republic Fin. Corp., 77 B.R. 282 (N.D. Okla. 1987).
126. Id. at 284.
127. While a consumer might consider a Venmo balance to be the functional equivalent
of a bank deposit, it is not clear that courts will view these as equivalents. Given the language
it uses in its policy statements about SPNBs, the OCC certainly does not seem to view them
as equivalents.
128. See OCC, Policy Statement, supra note 19 (describing the OCC’s decision and
process to accept special purpose bank charter applications from fintech companies).
129. Hayes, 62 F.2d at 600
Calling an institution a bank does not make it a bank in legal contemplation if it
is not given the powers of a bank. And conversely, calling an institution a trust
company does not prevent its being a bank within the meaning of the law, if
it possesses and exercises all the powers of a bank. The only way to create a bank
is to give it the powers of a bank.
(emphasis added).
130. Banking Law Scholars Brief, supra note 40, at 31; see also Sovern, supra note 7, at
192 (“While the power to receive deposits is undoubtedly an indispensable prerequisite to a
finding of banking, it does not follow that any corporation with that power is a bank.”); cf.
Nikolei M. Kaplanov Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case
Against its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 132 (2012) (writing that “[t]he [U.S.]
Code generally requires that the institution accept deposits in order to be classified as a bank,
in addition to other permissible activities”) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24). But see Brief of Professor
David Zaring as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency and Joseph Otting, Lacewell v. OCC, at *7 (writing that there are many chartered
institutions that do not take deposits (including trust banks and credit card banks chartered by
the OCC) and claiming that there are “[a]lmost no cases have held that firms must take
deposits if they want to obtain a bank charter.”).
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receive deposits bears an indispensable relation to . . . the banking business
more generally.”131 At least as applied to fintech lenders, this seems to be
clearly correct.
While the answer is less clear-cut when we consider SPNBs that offer
“payment-related service[s],” the answer is probably the same
nonetheless.132 The OCC has indicated that it will “consider on a case-bycase basis the permissibility of a new activity that a company seeking a
special purpose charter wishes to conduct.”133 And some firms that issue
“debit cards or engag[e] in other means of facilitating payments
electronically” hold customer funds in a manner that consumers may view
as being functionally similar to deposit-taking activity of traditional banks.134
Thus, a court could be persuaded that these entities, unlike fintech lenders,
hold “deposits” and are, therefore, sufficiently similar to a bank to warrant
exclusion from the bankruptcy system.
However, consumer expectations do not appear to be the lens through
which courts view this question. There are at least three reasons to doubt
that a court would conclude that a SPNB is a bank because it holds customer
balances for sending electronic payments or in connection with a debit card.
First, these customers balances are generally not FDIC-insured deposits.
Second, without a SPNB charter, these entities are generally classified as
money transmitters rather than banks under the relevant state law. Finally
(and to reiterate), the OCC itself does not regard these balances as deposits.
Courts might also look beyond state law or the views of the UCC for
interpretations for the word “bank” in section 109(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code. For example, courts may look for guidance from other federal statutes
that define the word bank.135 While “there is no single definition of a ‘bank’”
that is used at the federal level, courts might look to the Bank Holding
Company Act (the BHCA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (the
131. Brief of Conference of State Bank Supervisors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellee and Affirmance, Lacewell v. OCC, at 36 (“[T]he power to receive deposits bears an
indispensable relation to . . . the banking business more generally.”); see also Brief of
National Association of Consumer Credit Administrators and American Conference of
Uniform Consumer Credit Code States as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee and the New
York State Dept. of Fin. Srvcs., Lacewell v. OCC, at 9–10 (“A bank charter is unnecessary
unless the business seeks to engage in receiving deposits and, similarly, a bank has never been
chartered that did not intend to engage in receiving deposits . . . federal law also requires
national banks to be depository institutions.”).
132. OCC, Exploring SPNB Charters, supra note 20, at *2.
133. OCC, Exploring SPNB Charters, supra note 20, at *4.
134. OCC, Exploring SPNB Charters, supra note 20, at *4.
135. See Sovern, supra note 7, at 193–94 (“Banking has been defined in many contexts
outside of bankruptcy, and some of these definitions are occasionally referred to by
bankruptcy courts.”).
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FDIA) for guidance.136 Unfortunately, most extant definitions are
unhelpfully circular. For example, the FDIA defines deposits-taking as an
action that only a bank can take. Conversely, Glass-Steagall prohibits certain
non-banks from taking deposits.137 And neither the BHCA or FDIA serves
similar purposes to the Bankruptcy Code and therefore neither is a
particularly useful analogue. They also point in different directions. Under
the BHCA, SPNBs are not “banks,” but under the FDIA they may be.
Currently, the BHCA defines banks as “any institution organized under
the laws of the United States . . . which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor
has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of
making commercial loans.”138 As a result, SPNBs would all be excluded,
regardless of whether they hold customer funds. At this time, fintech
companies appear to either be exclusively lenders, which do not satisfy the
first part of the definition, or payment firms, which do not satisfy the second
part of the definition.139 Originally, the BHCA—like the FDIA—defined
banks as any entity with a bank charter.140 Under the original definition,
SPNBs would have qualified. But the definition has been substantially
narrowed and now requires that the entity accept demand deposits.141 In

136. Brynne Krause, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
How Increased Regulation Has Given Large Banks an Artificial Competitive Edge, 83
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1045, 1052 (discussing different definitions under state and federal law,
including the BHCA, the FDIA, Dodd Frank); cf. Menand & Ricks, supra note 105, at 46–47
(discussing the BHCA, the FDIA, and the Federal Reserve Act in concluding that these laws
all require national banks to be depository institutions).
137. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a).
138. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
139. Payment processors may or may not satisfy the first half of the definition either,
depending on how the customer funds are held. Venmo, for example, claims to hold customer
funds in “one or more custodial accounts we maintain for the benefit of Venmo account
holders at one or more FDIC member banks (currently Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. or The
Bancorp Bank), and the funds in your Venmo balance will be eligible to be insured by the
FDIC up to the standard maximum deposit insurance amount (currently $250,000).”) User
Agreement, VENMO, https://venmo.com/legal/us-user-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/X4844BXT].
140. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 23, at 115 (“As originally enacted, the BHCA defined
the term based simply on the formal charter.”).
141. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 23, at 115
In 1966, however, Congress introduced a functional definition of “bank” based
on whether or not an institution accepted deposits that could be withdrawn on
demand. In 1970, that functional definition was narrowed by adding the second
requirement that a “bank” had to be engaged in the business of making
commercial loans. This definition allowed proliferation of so-called “nonbank
banks” that had access to federal deposit insurance but structured their activities
to avoid being included in the definition of “bank.”

174

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:1

amending the BHCA’s definition of the term “bank,” Congress did nothing
to suggest that it intended to expand or restrict bankruptcy eligibility for
banks.142 This should not endear bankruptcy judges to the idea of adopting
the BHCA’s bank definition for bankruptcy purposes.
Additionally, the reason why the BHCA’s definition of “bank” has
morphed over time is because the underlying rationale for regulating bank
holding companies has changed.143 The purpose of the law shifted from
preventing monopolies to systemic risk prevention.144 Bankruptcy policy, by
contrast, is neither about preventing excess concentration nor about avoiding
systemic risk to the national economy. Instead, core bankruptcy policies
include consolidating creditor collection efforts and ensuring the equitable
treatment of similarly situated creditors, including the distribution of losses,
and providing a fresh start for honest but unfortunate debtors.145 Thus,
bankruptcy policy and BHCA policy are not well-aligned and the definition
for banks provided by the BHCA does not seem terribly appropriate to use.146
However, it is worth noting that if the BHCA definition were to be used,
SPNBs would not be “banks.”147 This is similar to the treatment of credit
142. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 23, at 138–39.
143. For a terrific article on the BHCA’s changing statutory language and Congress’
changing regulatory rationales, see generally Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 23.
144. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 23, at 117, 129, 190
The explicit exemptions under CEBA were ultimately traceable to the same
policy rationale that the exempted institutions did not pose risk of excessive
concentration of commercial credit and, more generally, economic and political
power. An additional rationale for the exemptions was the fact that some of these
entities, such as thrifts and credit unions, were subject to parallel regulatory
regimes.
145. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1987) (describing
differences of opinions among bankruptcy scholars about bankruptcy’s core purposes); see
also Clarke v. Rogers, 228 U.S. 534, 548 (1913) (calling “[e]quality between creditors . . .
necessarily the ultimate aim of the Bankruptcy Law”).
146. “FIRREA granted the FDIC and RTC the power to discriminate among claims on the
failed institution, in contrast to the traditional rule that all claims in the same class must
receive the same percentage recovery.” Swire, supra note 97, at 487. Also bank depositors
are favored in an FDIC wind-down relative to the position they would enjoy in a bankruptcy
proceeding. See Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The
Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 318 (1987) (“The
primary difference is that the thrust of bankruptcy laws is to ensure that creditors of the same
class are treated equally, whereas federal deposit insurance ensures that certain classes of
creditors are paid in full.”).
147. Credit card banks, which have a special purpose national bank charter similar to the
fintech charter, are also exempt from the BHCA’s definition of bank. Omarova & Tahyar,
supra note 23, at 171–72 (“Beginning with the 1966 Amendments, however, credit card banks
were implicitly exempted from the definition of a bank, because they did not accept demand
deposits. In 1987, CEBA explicitly excluded credit card banks from the BHCA’s definition
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card banks, which cannot accept demand deposits, and are exempt from the
BHCA’s definition of bank.148 Credit card banks are exempted from the
BHCA “primarily because these institutions offered very limited and highly
specialized consumer financial services and did not pose the risk of
monopolizing commercial credit markets.”149 Fintech lenders are generally
very similar in these regards and should expect similar treatment.
By contrast, if bankruptcy courts were to adopt the FDIA’s definition
of bank, then SPNBs might be ineligible for bankruptcy protection. The
FDIA defines bank as “any national bank and State bank, and any Federal
branch and insured branch.”150 Because the OCC seeks to issue “special
purpose national bank” charters, entities that have one would—on their
face—be national banks within the meaning of the FDIA. But, as Lev
Menand and Morgan Ricks explain, the FDIA presupposes that all national
banks are depository institutions.151 Thus, if Menand and Ricks are correct
that being a national bank requires an entity be a depository institution,
SPNBs would not be banks for purposes of section 109(b)(2), even if the
FDIA’s definition were used.152
Once again, however, FDIC policy and bankruptcy policy are not wellaligned and, therefore, the FDIA seems to be as bad an analogue as the
BHCA. The FDIC’s mission “is to maintain stability and public confidence
in the nation’s financial system” by protecting bank depositors in the event
of bank failures.153 In other words, the FDIC’s goal is to preference bank

of a bank, subject to certain limitations.”) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)(1988)).
148. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 23, at 171; see also REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE
PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, FED. RESERVE,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2019-report-to-congress-profitability-creditcard-operations-depository-institutions.htm [https://perma.cc/M9HJ-RDTR] (July 2019)
(defining credit card banks as “(1) [m]ore than 50 percent of their assets are loans to
individuals (consumer lending), and (2) 90 percent or more of their consumer lending involves
credit cards or related plans”).
149. Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 23, at 172.
150. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(1)(A). This language seems very similar to the original BHCA
definition. “In its original form, the BHCA defined ‘bank’ by charter mean ‘any national
banking association or any State bank, bank, or trust company’ and explicitly excluded only
those that were organized by U.S. bank holding companies to offshore.” Omarova & Tahyar,
supra note 23, at 141.
151. Menand & Ricks, supra note 105, at *46–47 (from the November 2020 version on
file with author) (“The Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) requires national banks to
obtain deposit insurance, presupposing that they are in the deposit business.”).
152. Menand & Ricks, supra note 105, at *46 (“Congress thus understood that “all”
national banks were depository institutions.”).
153. About, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/about/what-wedo/ [https://perma.cc/7VDN-UWW9].
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depositors above other creditors.154 This stands in contrast with the
bankruptcy system’s focus on the equitable treatment of creditors.155 This
policy focus also provides further support to Menand and Ricks’
interpretation of the FDIA and suggests that SPNBs should not be considered
banks for purposes of section 109(b)(2).
Having multiple tests to determine the meaning of the term “bank” in
section 109(b)(2) creates the possibility of inconsistent results. An entity
might be a bank if the OCC’s treatment of SPNBs is determinative under the
state classification test but would not be a bank under the independent
classification test. In such a case, I would expect that the state classification
test’s results would give way to the court’s own judgment because federal
bankruptcy policy should not give way to aggressive maneuvering by a
federal banking regulator. But this outcome is far from certain because of
the state classification test’s perceived preeminence. Alternatively, an entity
might be a bank if the FDIA’s “bank” definition is used, but not if the
BHCA’s definition is used. But neither statute seems like a particularly good
analogue, and neither are likely to be relied upon.
C. The alternative relief test
Finally, a few courts also use the so-called “alternate relief test,” in
which the court examines “‘congressional intent and factors of practicality
and policy’ to determine whether the Bankruptcy Code would be a
satisfactory alternative to the state rehabilitation and liquidation law.”156 If
the independent classification test is thought of as using traditional methods
of statutory interpretation, and the state classification test as deference to a
bank’s regulators, the alternative relief test can be best thought of as courtconsidered policy arguments. However, courts do not consistently assign the
same labels to the same inquiries, and some courts conduct a policy analysis

154. Fischel, et al., supra note 146, at 318 (“The primary difference is that the thrust of
bankruptcy laws is to ensure that creditors of the same class are treated equally, whereas
federal deposit insurance ensures that certain classes of creditors are paid in full.”).
155. Fischel, et al., supra note 146, at 318.
156. Grohsgal, et al., The Twilight Zone of HMO Insolvencies, 13-MAY AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 22 (May 1994) (citing In re Estate of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d at 439); see also In re
Republic Trust & Sav. Co., 59 B.R. at 615 (describing this test as overlapping the other two
and focusing on the timeline in this particular case where the bankruptcy was well progressed
when Oklahoma asserting the right to control the liquidation as being important to the
avoidance of delay and noting the important of bankruptcy avoidance powers). Id. at 614
(“[C]ourts should consider whether a bankruptcy proceeding is a satisfactory method,
compared with available State and Federal non-bankruptcy methods, of reorganizing or
liquidating a would-be debtor.”).
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under the guise of the independent classification test.157 Additionally, this
test is the least well-adopted because some courts believe that the statutory
text is clear.158
Courts that use the alternative relief test are likely to determine the
Bankruptcy Code is a satisfactory alternative to the OCC’s liquidation
scheme and state regimes. A full description of the differences between the
OCC’s liquidation scheme and the Bankruptcy Code is provided in Section
IV and the Appendix. But it’s worth noting here that the OCC (and state
regulators) would not be the residual claimant in the insolvency of a nondepository institution.159 They merely offer a mostly neutral forum for
resolving the SPNB’s financial distress, which is just like a bankruptcy court.
But the Bankruptcy Code offers two additional advantages. First, its
processes are far better established than the OCC’s recently enacted and
never-before-used procedures for winding down uninsured national banks
like SPNBs. Second, the Code is much more detailed than the bare bones
procedures the OCC has rolled out.
In addition, bankruptcy courts have been used to wind down investment
banks, such as Drexel and Lehman, to good effect.160 Speed is a common
justification for administrative resolution, but bankruptcy courts can also act
quite quickly.161 And since SPNBs will not hold insured deposits (or a near
157. See, e.g., In re Republic Trust & Sav. Co., 59 B.R. at 614 (noting the overlap between
the alternate relief test and the other two tests.)
158. See In re Colo. Indus. Bank, 84 B.R. at 738 n.2
Since this court’s decision regarding its jurisdiction over the debtor is based upon
a compelling application of the fundamental canons of judicial statutory
construction, the court found it unnecessary to resort to the other two tests.
Moreover, the court is convinced that the ‘state classification test’ is
inappropriate for determining jurisdiction because its utilization would result in
an abdication of a federal court’s responsibility to interpret federal law. No state
scheme can override Congress’s own intention as to who should be eligible for
bankruptcy relief and the mere fact that a debtor is an industrial bank as defined
by state law is not dispositive of the issue of federal jurisdiction under the
Bankruptcy Code.
cf. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 334 (2010) (“We cannot replace the actual text with
speculation as to Congress’ intent.”); United States v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 1997)
(“If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, that language is conclusive absent clear
legislative intent to the contrary.”).
159. Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 1012–25 (2010) (discussing why it is important that the FDIC is
the residual claimant of most insolvent depository institutions); see infra, text accompanying
notes 195–198 (discussing the residual claimant issue).
160. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469,
477–83 (2010).
161. See infra text accompanying notes 179-196.
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equivalent), the resolution of many SPNBs in bankruptcy should proceed at
an acceptable, if slightly slower, pace.162 To the extent that bank resolution
under a federal banking regulator can proceed more quickly, it is because
creditors’ participatory rights are given short shrift as compared to a
bankruptcy proceeding.163 In bankruptcy proceedings, creditors have
substantially greater rights to participate in the entity’s resolution than under
the OCC process. Without a need for immediate action because of harm to
depositors or systemic risk—neither of which applies to fintech lenders164—
bankruptcy is a more appropriate forum because creditor participation rights
are generally better respected in bankruptcy than outside of it.165 However,
customers of SPNBs that do hold something akin to deposits will want rapid
access to their funds. For customers of such entities, the OCC’s bank
resolution process may be a superior option but only if it treats the funds held
by fintech payment processors as customer deposits entitled to priority
distribution. And it may not.
It is true that if SPNBs were bankruptcy-eligible and still subject to the
OCC’s liquidation scheme there would be potentially inconsistent
insolvency regimes. Concerns about potential inconsistency have given
pause to some courts but not others. For example, in In re Manufacturers’
Nat’l Bank, the court held that national banks could not be liquidated under
the 1867 Bankruptcy Act because the National Bank Act (NBA) provided “a
very complete and detailed scheme or plan for administering the affairs of
an insolvent national bank” and that the NBA and the 1867 Bankruptcy Act
were fundamentally incompatible with each other.166 Since that case was
decided in 1873, the bankruptcy scheme has grown more complete and
detailed; it is the new OCC liquidation scheme that appears more

162.
163.
164.
165.

Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1007–12 (describing the need for speed).
See infra text accompanying note 236.
See infra text accompanying notes 223–231.
Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 483

[B]ankruptcy laws provide numerous formal and informal mechanisms for
creditors to exercise control over the liquidation process. These include formal
rights given to creditors’ committees, the opportunity of creditors to object to the
terms and timing of asset sales, and indirect control over the debtor through
covenants in DIP loan agreements.
166. In re Manufacturers’ Nat’l Bank, 16 Fed. Cas. 665, 669 (N.D. Ill. 1873); see also
Boyd v. Schneider, 131 F. 223, 227 (7th Cir. 1904)
No one doubts the power of congress to provide the machinery for such
administration, and no one doubts the intention of congress, in the enactment of
the national banking act, that to the extent national banks were concerned, such
machinery should be embodied in the powers conferred upon the comptroller.
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rudimentary. And, more recently, courts have dismissed concerns about
inconsistent insolvency regimes outside of the bankruptcy context, writing
that “[c]ongress was certainly aware of the potential for inconsistent
insolvency regimes, but obviously concluded that the interest in continuing
state regulation into insolvency outweighed any interest in uniformity. We
will not second guess that determination.”167 For these reasons, courts that
use the alternative relief test are likely to determine the Bankruptcy Code is
a satisfactory alternative to the OCC’s liquidation scheme and state regimes
for most, if not all, SPNBs.
***
In conclusion, Section II reviewed the judicially created tests for
establishing the meaning of a “bank” under section 109(b)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code and has established that bankruptcy courts are likely to
conclude that SPNBs are not “banks.” As a result, SPNBs are likely to be
deemed eligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code unless there is
some overriding policy reason to deny them access. That question is taken
up in the next Section.
III.

THE POLICY RATIONALES FOR EXCLUDING BANKS FROM
BANKRUPTCY

“Even though the word ‘bankruptcy’ derives from bank failure, modern
banks never technically go bankrupt, no matter how hard it sometimes seems
they try.”168
In this Section, eight of the historic rationales for excluding commercial
banks from bankruptcy are reviewed and then applied to SPNBs to consider
whether SPNBs should also be excluded from bankruptcy. These rationales
are: (i) banks’ fragility and the possibility that unexpected and correlated
bank closures could freeze the economy; (ii) the breadth of people who
deposit their savings with banks and the harm banks closing without
repaying depositors would have; (iii) the need for expert oversight of a
bank’s insolvency proceedings; (iv) the historic exclusion from bankruptcy
because of available alternative liquidation procedures and the need to avoid
conflicting regimes for the sake of efficiency; (v) banks’ systemic
importance to the functioning of the economy by, among other things,
providing liquidity for consumers, businesses and governments, (vi)
167. In re Estate of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d at 447; In re Prudence, 79 F.2d at 78
(allowing an involuntary bankruptcy petition under the Bankruptcy Act to continue even after
“the superintendent of banks of the state of New York . . . took possession of the property and
business of the Prudence Company, Inc. [the debtor]”).
168. Swire, supra note 97, at 471.
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appointing the residual claimant as receiver, (vii) preserving banks’ ongoing
operations and avoiding their liquidation; and (viii) avoiding the high costs
of lost confidence.169 To preview my conclusions, only the first three
justifications potentially have bite in the context of distressed SPNBs, but
none requires that bankruptcy give way to an administrative liquidation
process.
The first potential justification for excluding banks from bankruptcy
comes from Robert Bliss and George Kaufman, who explain that the
resolution of financially distressed banks was historically treated differently
than non-bank firms because banks were thought to be particularly fragile
yet important to the efficient functioning of the national economy.170 As a
result, we need to treat banks with kid gloves and not subject them to the
harsh bankruptcy process. Banks are perceived as being especially fragile
for at least two reasons. First, banks have historically had a funding
mismatch because they make long-term loans (assets) funded by short-term
deposits (liabilities).171 This asset-liability mismatch creates a risk that if
depositors lose faith in a bank and simultaneously seek to withdraw their
deposits, depositors create a “run” on the bank that renders it insolvent.172
Second, problems with one bank can create a cascading effect on other banks
because bank finances are often “closely interconnected through inter-bank
deposits and loans.”173
As noted above, there are two types of fintech companies that are

169. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 318–19; Swire, supra note 97, at 478; Green, supra
note 96, at 914; Sovern, supra note 7, at 220; Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy in the
Administrative State, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 9–10 (1987); Skeel, Law & Finance,
supra note 4, at 723 (“Because banks, insurance companies, and related financial
intermediaries play an important role in the financial security of the citizenry, the government
has a strong interest in assuring their soundness and in preventing the kinds of systemic
failures that led to financial devastation in the Depression.”).
170. “Banks are exempted from the general corporate bankruptcy code and subject to
special provisions because they are frequently viewed as ‘special’ and different from other
firms both in their importance to the aggregate economy and in their financial fragility and
vulnerability.” Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 12, at 3, n.3.
171. See KERN ALEXANDER, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING REGULATION 295 (CAMBRIDGE U.
PRESS 2019) (reporting that ‘“maturity transformation’” is “a major concern for bank
regulators because the practice of borrowing short and lending long can pose risks to society
if banks fail to manage their risks effectively”); see also CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN
H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISES & SCARCE
CREDIT 29 (PRINCETON U. PRESS 2014) (“[B]ankers face the risk that, even if their banks are
not insolvent, worried depositors might show up en masse to withdraw their money, and there
might not be enough cash in the till to satisfy all those withdrawal demands.”).
172. Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at 3 (“Banks have a large
proportion of their liabilities in very short-term debt that can easily be withdrawn (run).”).
173. Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at 3.
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eligible for SPNB charters: fintech lenders and payment processors. The
former are unlikely to be depository institutions, but the latter firms do hold
substantial customer balances that may be, practically speaking,
withdrawable on demand.174 Thus, fintech lenders may be able to eliminate
the asset-liability mismatch that can bedevil depository institutions, but
payment firms are likely to be more susceptible to coordinated consumer
actions.175 As a result, this rationale has greater bite in the latter case than in
the former. However, it remains a potential issue even for non-depository
fintech lenders.
The OCC intends to provide prudential oversight of SPNBs and should
be able to force fintech lenders to avoid the asset-liability mismatch. Thus,
in theory, runs should not happen in the same way with well-managed fintech
lenders. In practice, however, there is evidence that non-banks are “often
reliant on short-term financing similar to deposits.”176 Consider that Lehman
Brothers, an investment bank that failed in the Great Recession, obtained
substantial funding through short-term repos and the overnight commercial
paper market, which proved to be a terrible decision once those markets froze
up during the Great Recession.177 Although Lehman Brothers could have
obtained longer term funding to match its longer term liabilities, it chose not
to do so and the SEC, its primary regulator, did not force it to do so. As a
result, while this issue is potentially avoidable in the context of fintech
lenders, it may nevertheless have some bite. However, if the OCC fails to
address SPNB’s funding mismatch, one might reasonably query whether we
should leave the OCC in charge of addressing the fallout from its own
regulatory failure. As for interconnectedness, I have not seen any evidence
that fintech companies’ finances are as interconnected as bank finances are

174. See e.g., supra notes 36, 134 (discussing customer funds held by Venmo in
connection with their debit card offering).
175. Cf. Hilary J. Allen, Payments Failure, 62 BOSTON COLL. L. REV. 453, 462–63 (2021)
(exploring the vulnerability of new fintech “[p]ayments systems . . . to mass technological
failures . . . as reliance on electronic processing and communication has increased”).
176. Swire, supra note 97, at 496 (noting “[o]ver time, the distinctions between banks and
other corporations have eroded significantly, with non-banks today often reliant on short-term
financing similar to deposits”); see also CSBS Letter, supra note 102 (“[I]n contrast, nondepository institutions have much less resilient liability structures heavily dependent on
higher cost, volatile, short-term funding provided by sophisticated, institutional investors,
who are likely to withdraw their funds at the earliest indication of potential problems.”);
Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13
N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 73–74 (2009); CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE
SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 125–31 (2019).
177. See Moran, supra note 176, at 73–78 (illustrating the Lehman Brothers’ investment
failure).
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said to be.178
Related to this first justification, some suggest that banks’ financial
distress must be resolved more quickly than would be possible in a
bankruptcy proceeding because of banks’ perceived importance and
fragility.179 For example, Bliss & Kaufman write that “the [FDIA]
recognized the need to resolve banks differently than other firms by
providing for speedy administrative action outside the slower judicial
system.”180 Hynes and Walt have also written about the importance of the
speedy satisfaction of the claims of some bank creditors.181 There are two
aspects to this claim. First, speedy resolution of an entity’s financial distress
is required. Second, Chapter 11 offers insufficiently quick resolution. Both
are contested.
Even when an entity has deposit liabilities, some have argued that an
especially speedy liquidation of a bank’s assets is not required.182 For
example, Fischel, Rosenfield, and Stillman argue that justifying an
administrative bank resolution process because of the need for speedy
depositor access to funds “is questionable today because [many] depositors
have available liquidity substitutes such as money market funds and credit
cards.”183 Others, though, disagree. For example, Kathleen Engel and Pat

178. See Bruckner, Promise and Perils, supra note 45, at 32–33 & n.197 (describing how
fintech lenders fund their loans); see also Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Marketplace
Lending, supra note 45, at 789–93 (highlighting different fintech lending models, such as
balance-sheet/direct-funding model and bank-partnership model). But see Allen, supra note
175, at 469 (arguing “[t]he retail payments ecosystem . . . qualifies as a complex adaptive
system and is susceptible to cascade failure”).
179. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 492–93 (writing that FDIC’s mandate to take
“prompt corrective action . . . has some attractive features (namely, speed) that are more
appropriate to limiting systemic risk”); see also Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison,
supra note 8, at 3.
180. Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at 5; see also Ayotte & Skeel,
supra note 160, at 482 (citing Luigi Zingales, Why Paulson is Wrong, ECONOMIST’S VOICE,
(Sept. 2008), http://gesd.free.fr/zingales.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B3U-ES4E] for the
proposition that Chapter 11 is “too slow and costly”); Fischel, et al., supra note 146, at 318
(noting that even a short delay in depositor’s access to their “funds has historically been
thought to be intolerable”).
181. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1008–09.
182. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1008 (“We are skeptical of the possible benefits
of speed and conclude that speed does not justify giving the FDIC control over the resolution
process.”).
183. Fischel, et al., supra note 146, at 318
Even if there is still some basis for the traditional view—perhaps because the
alternatives are not perfect substitutes for bank deposits—it certainly does not
justify providing de facto insurance to all depositors, no matter how large. A
preferable system might be to insure small depositors while allowing the
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McCoy note that there were multiple depositor runs during the 2008 financial
crisis, and particularly highlighting IndyMac’s downfall.184
Separately, Hynes and Walt argue that the need to give depositors
timely access to their funds depends not on selling the failed bank’s assets
but ensuring that FDIC insurance makes funds promptly available to those
depositors.185 Once again, therefore, this rationale presents a mixed bag.
Regardless of whether the speedy resolution of depository institutions is
required, fintech lenders do not hold customer deposits and there is no
particular need for haste on this account. By contrast, payment firms do hold
funds for customers and customers likely expect to have ready access to
those funds.186 If these firms were to fail, customers would be cut off from
that access. As such, the speedy resolution of payment firms with SPNB
charters may be important and FDIC insurance is not likely to be relevant to
creditors of fintech payment firms.187
But does Chapter 11 offer an insufficiently quick resolution? Again,
this is contested. It is not at all apparent that regulators act promptly to
resolve problems with banks or that regulators initiate administrative
resolution of insolvent entities more promptly then creditors will initiate
bankruptcy proceedings.188 As Ayotte and Skeel write, “recent examples

bankruptcy laws to operate for larger creditors.
184. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT,
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 176-77 (OXFORD U. PRESS 2011) (noting IndyMac
Bank was deemed “well capitalized” in January 2008 but after a run on the bank deprived the
bank of $1.3 billion in deposits, IndyMac closed in July 2008); see also Allen, supra note
175, at 461 (discussing how a “run dynamic also was central to sparking the 2007–2008
financial crisis”).
185. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 990 (“The identified benefits of speed depend
on the timely reimbursement of insured depositors (a matter governed by the terms of FDIC
insurance) and not on the sale of the failed bank’s assets.”).
186. Customer expectations may not be well-grounded in their legal rights, however.
Paypal, for instance, notes that many of its users “will experience a time when their funds
become unavailable, also known as a payment hold.” See Why are your funds unavailable or
on hold? And what can you do about it? PAYPAL (July 10, 2020), https://www.paypal.com
/us/brc/article/funds-availability [https://perma.cc/4S66-HHJ2] (describing situations where
Paypal will not release customer funds for 21 days).
187. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 492–93 (describing the prompt resolution of
a bank’s assets for the benefit of depositors as requiring that a “bank’s unprotected investors
(unsecured creditors and shareholders)” give up substantial rights and arguing that “while this
is defensible with commercial banks, because the vast majority of their liabilities are deposits,
it is far more problematic with other firms”); see also Fischel, et al., supra note 146, at 318
(explaining that the need for speed has historically been a justification when consumer
deposits are involved).
188. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 472 (2010); see also Bliss & Kaufman, Economic
Comparison, supra note 8, at 25 (“[T]he objectives of prompt corrective action are not entirely
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suggest that bank regulators often are unable or unwilling to identify
distressed institutions and trigger a resolution procedure before the
institution becomes deeply insolvent.”189 Instead of bank regulators, Ayotte
and Skeel argue that the best situated party to identify troubled entities in
need of intervention are the bank’s managers and investors (i.e. creditors).190
It is not simply creditors may decide to more promptly initiate
insolvency proceedings than bank regulators; bankruptcy cases may proceed
as or more quickly than administrative bank liquidations. It is true that “a
typical purchase and assumption of a failed bank [by the FDIC] is quicker”
than a typical bankruptcy case because it typically happens over the
weekend.191 Nonetheless, a typical purchase and assumption proceeds only
marginally faster than many section 363 sales192 which have become an
increasingly important, though criticized, part of bankruptcy practice.193 And
met,” as evidenced by “the fact that almost all banks that have been closed by regulators since
FDICIA were economically insolvent, usually imposing total losses on general unsecured
creditors and some losses on uninsured depositors[.]”).
189. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 472 (2010)
As a result, prompt resolution can only be guaranteed with the promise of
taxpayer assistance behind it. The distress of financial firms thus poses an
inescapable choice: regulators must either allow counterparties to take losses, and
thus confront the possibility of systemic effects, or they must use taxpayer money
to prevent the losses from being realized. Bankruptcy has proven to be an
adequate mechanism for handling the former choice, and it is flexible enough to
accommodate the latter.
See also Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at 27; Skeel, Law & Finance,
supra note 4, at 724 (“[I]n both bank and insurance law . . . only regulators can initiate an
insolvency proceeding.”).
190. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 492 (the “prompt corrective action approach” . . .
“is designed to assure early closure of troubled banks, and it relies on regulators to determine
when and how to intervene, rather than the parties with the best information—the bank’s
managers and investors”); see also Skeel, Law & Finance, supra note 4, at 724 (“Managers
are even better informed than regulators and are particularly well positioned to know when a
troubled firm belongs in an insolvency proceeding.”).
191. Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 989, 1004 (“Some purchase and assumption
transactions can be quite similar to bankruptcies that utilize Section 363 to sell all or
substantially all of the assets. Both processes can be used to quickly transfer the core assets
or goodwill of the failed entity to an acquirer.”).
192. Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1050 (“Granted, the FDIC sometimes sells all or
substantially all of the assets of the failed bank immediately upon seizing the failed bank.
These resolutions are marginally quicker than the fastest bankruptcies resolved by use of
Section 363.”); see also Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 479 (discussing the speedy
resolution of most of Drexel Burnham’s most liquid assets).
193. See Bruckner, Bankruptcy Sales, supra note 16, at 1 (“Over the past thirty years,
bankruptcy sales have become a vitally important aspect of bankruptcy practice.”); see also
Final Report and Recommendations, AM. BANKR. INST. COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM
OF CHAPTER 11 (2012-14), https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h [https://pe
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Belk, the department store chain, recently set a record for completing its
“prepackaged restructuring . . . in less than 21 hours.”194 Unfortunately, the
speed of 363 sales often comes at the expense of the procedural protections
for creditors baked into other parts of the Bankruptcy Code.
Similarly, Ayotte and Skeel point to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
cases as evidence that Chapter 11 is neither too slow or costly to address
bank failures.195 In those cases, they argue, that “faced with extreme time
pressure, buyers materialized, and Lehman quickly sold its viable
subsidiaries, allowing them to remain in business under different
ownership.”196 Ayotte and Skeel also note that the investment bank Drexel
Burnham only took a week to liquidate “82% of its securities, leaving mostly
low quality, hard to value junk bonds in its portfolio” and this took place
during an era when bankruptcy cases were routinely criticized for taking far
too long.197 That said, the creditors of an investment bank like Lehman
Brothers are probably very different from the creditors of a hypothetical
SPNB payments firm that is similar to Venmo. In summary, bankruptcies
can be a speedy process. Thus, even if we are concerned about the failure of
SPNB payment firms, it is not clear that bankruptcy cannot address those
failures in a timely fashion.
When time is not of the essence, bankruptcy can certainly be an
appropriately prompt process for resolving a banks’ financial distress. Since
the OCC has not “appointed a receiver for an uninsured bank since shortly
after the Congress established the FDIC in response to the banking panics of
1930-1933,” the FDIC receivership process may be our best guide to what
an OCC receivership would look like.198 Hynes and Walt write that the
rma.cc/8WH3-J39D].
194. Soma Biswas, Sycamore’s Belk to Exit Bankruptcy Within One Day, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 24, 2021, 4:33 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sycamores-belk-to-exit-bankrup
tcy-within-one-day-11614202411?st=whnwrdcx65br2nw [https://perma.cc/9RXW-PXFN].
Obviously, in a prepackaged bankruptcy there is some time spent on the “prepackaging,” but
that time could also be spent in advance on a prepackaged bankruptcy for an SPNB.
195. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 477–82 (discussing the speedy resolution of
investment banks, Drexel Burnham and Lehman, in bankruptcy to argue that “bankruptcy is
surprisingly well-designed to handle the failures of nonbank financial firms”); see also Hynes
& Walt, supra note 159, at 989 (discussing the speedy resolution of the automobile bankruptcy
cases after the Great Recession, which “generated headlines because the sales were completed
in a matter of weeks”).
196. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 482.
197. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 479–80 (noting Drexel Burnham was able to
liquidate most of its securities within a week and it did so “at a time when delay was seen as
a great shortcoming of Chapter 11”).
198. It is hard to compare OCC receiverships, since we have not had one in approximately
ninety years. See RECEIVERSHIPS FOR UNINSURED NATIONAL BANKS, OFF. OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, [Docket ID OCC-2016-0017] 12 C.F.R. Pt. 51 (Dec. 15,
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FDIC’s experience in resolving failed banks suggests that bankruptcy is
often faster and that there is “no reason to believe that the FDIC would
resolve a bank holding company much more quickly than would bankruptcy,
unless the FDIC were willing to provide substantial assistance that shifts
much of the risk of loss to the FDIC itself.”199 In FDIC receiverships, the
FDIC takes more than two and a half times as long to dispose of assets (four
years) than the average time the bankruptcy courts took “to dispose of the
filings of large publicly traded corporations between 1995 and 2008.”200
Hynes and Walt note that “the FDIC often retains a sizable portion of the
failed bank’s assets, by choice or necessity, and liquidates them over
time.”201 They report that “[t]he FDIC’s own resolution manual proposes a
four-year liquidation schedule, and the average time elapsed between the
seizure of failed banks between 2002 and 2003 and the date of the last
distribution to depositors was forty-seven months. In only one transaction
was the final payment made in less than one year (ten months).”202
Although the OCC process could be faster than the FDIC process,
there’s little reason to believe that would be true. Thus, in these longer cases,
bankruptcy courts may well be faster.203 Therefore, while the first rationale
may have some bite in the context of SPNBs, bankruptcy is probably a fine
pathway to resolve distressed SPNBs. In other words, this difference—if
there is one—may not favor the OCC receivership process.
The second justification for treating banks differently than non-banks
is that most banks are depository institutions.204 Deposits represent the

2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-160a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FF4F-QRMZ]. (“The OCC has not appointed a receiver for an uninsured
bank since shortly after the Congress established the FDIC in response to the banking panics
of 1930-1933.”). And we have not seen the OLA process used yet.
199. Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1050.
200. Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1050.
201. Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1009.
202. Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1012 (“Perhaps the greatest weakness with the
speed of liquidation argument is that the FDIC does not, in fact, quickly liquidate the assets
of the failed bank.”).
203. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 480
Drexel showed, nearly two decades before Lehman, that bankruptcy need not
take too long to effectively resolve the financial distress of a financial institution.
Drexel filed for bankruptcy in 1990, at a time when delay was seen as a great
shortcoming of Chapter 11. To be sure, the case did take more than two years to
complete. But even in an era of long cases, Drexel’s most time sensitive assets
were redeployed almost immediately, long before the eventual reorganization.
see also Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1050.
204. Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 2 (“Since 1864, deposit-taking has been an essential part
of the ‘business of banking’ conducted by national banks.”).
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collective savings of a substantial portion of residents of the United States.205
If banks were to close precipitously without repaying their depositors, many
people of “limited financial means and expertise” would lose their entire nest
egg.206 But fintech lenders are exclusively non-depository institutions and
therefore this rationale has no bite at all in this context. While fintech
payment processors do hold something akin to bank deposits, the volume of
those customer funds is not that great. Whereas the largest banks hold
balances in the trillions, the largest payment processors hold just tens of
billions of dollars in customer funds.207 Of course the people who have
deposited those billions of dollars may very well need access to them
promptly. But it is not clear that the OCC’s administrative resolution process
would advantage these consumers relative to bankruptcy.
The third justification—the need for expert oversight of a bank’s
insolvency proceedings—may also provide some degree of support for
excluding SPNBs from bankruptcy. The need for expert regulation of
financial institutions, particularly when entities are in financial trouble,
counsels in favor of allowing an entity’s primary regulator to wind down its
operations, thus preventing information asymmetries.208 As Professor David
205. Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at 2 (“Bank deposits (debt)
are held by a large proportion of the population, including those of limited financial means
and expertise, and in a wide range of denominations, including very small amounts.”).
206. Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at 2.
207. See The Biggest US Banks by Total Deposits, MX (May 25, 2021), https://www.mx.c
om/moneysummit/biggest-us-banks-by-deposits/ [https://perma.cc/A5YH-87FS] (describing
the biggest US banks’ deposits). By contrast, Paypal, which owns Venmo, reports that it
holds only about $35 billion dollars in customer money. See Paypal Holdings, Inc, Annual
Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 4, 2021) https://sec.report/Document/0001633917-21-000018/
[https://perma.cc/LQ2E-JN8V] (CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS, “Funds payable
and amounts due to customers”).
208. See David A. Skeel, Bankruptcy for Banks: A Tribute (and Little Plea) to Jay
Westbrook, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP PENN L., 6 (2021); Skeel, Law & Finance, supra note 4, at 735
[R]egulators are a sensible choice to initiate insolvency proceedings in heavily
regulated industries such as banking and insurance because their involvement in
the regulatory process gives them extensive information about a given bank or
insurance company. Regulators ideally will know when a financial intermediary
has encountered financial distress and can commence a receivership or other
insolvency proceeding at that time. Regulators also are well positioned to
consider the systemic effects of a bank failure rather than focusing solely on the
troubled bank.
see also Sovern, supra note 7, at 220
[E]xpertise in the handling of an insolvent bank’s affairs is made possible by the
statutory authorization of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to accept
appointment as receiver of any closed insured bank if the appointment is offered
‘by the authority having supervision of such bank and is authorized or permitted
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Skeel writes, “[r]egulators are thus likely to be well-informed about an
institution that encounters financial distress from the moment the trouble
begins. A bankruptcy judge, by contrast, would have little or no contact with
the institution until the moment it filed for bankruptcy.”209 Presumably one
advantage to having the OCC rather than a debtor or its creditors decide
whether to initiate an insolvency proceeding for a SPNB is because the OCC
will have a more clear-eyed appraisal of whether the entity is insolvent.210
However, Skeel also warns that “the advantages of regulator initiation
often prove more theoretical than real” because regulators’ parochial interest
may encourage them to delay action to avoid the failure of a bank or
insurance company on their watch.211 By contrast, creditors have a financial
incentive to monitor their investments in a distressed SPNB and to take steps
to force it into bankruptcy when they believe it necessary. Thus, while
bankruptcy judges will bring less experience to bear in resolving a SPNB’s
financial troubles, the ease in which creditors can initiate bankruptcy cases
at least partially outweighs that downside.
The first three rationales are the only ones that potentially justify
excluding SPNBs from bankruptcy, but they do not require that outcome. As
just noted, there are good counterarguments to each. The remaining

by State law.’
Swire, supra note 97, at 503–04 (suggesting that the FDIC has “a plausible claim to expertise”
in bank insolvency cases because it is a repeat player and setting forth at least one reason why
FDIC receiverships might be preferable to resolution in bankruptcy).
209. Skeel, Bankruptcy for Banks, supra note 208; Eisenberg, supra note 169, at 10 (“If
special expertise is needed to assist troubled financial institutions, the bankruptcy court, the
traditional bankruptcy forum, may be at a relative disadvantage vis-a-vis federal or state
regulatory authorities.” ).
210. “If regulators were fully informed and had appropriate incentives to initiate in a
timely fashion, their monopoly over initiation would make perfect sense.” Skeel, Law &
Finance, supra note 4, at 724 (arguing that regulators have mixed results as insolvency regime
initiators and that managers are better suited to decide whether to initiate an insolvency
proceeding).
211. Skeel, Law & Finance, supra note 4, at 735
Because regulators do not have a financial interest in any given bank or insurance
company, they often have little to lose if they wait too long to initiate a
receivership, and much to gain by delaying: bank or insurance company failure
may reflect badly on the regulators, so a regulator may be better off if the failure
occurs after they have departed.
Skeel, Law & Finance, supra note 4, at 741 (“[G]iven regulators’ political disincentive to
close banks promptly and related factors such as the relationships examiners develop with
managers of the banks they monitor, one suspects that regulators may continue to initiate
insolvency proceedings inefficiently late—particularly in times when the number of troubled
banks begins to rise.”).
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traditional justifications for excluding banks from bankruptcy, which are
discussed below, do not apply to SPNBs and cannot justify their exclusion
from bankruptcy. Thus, bankruptcy may be an equally good (or possibly
superior) forum for addressing the financial distress of SPNBs.
The fourth rationale is historic. To wit: banks have long been excluded
from bankruptcy. Professor Swire dates “[t]he perceived need for a special
bank insolvency regime . . . to 1837 and to 1857, when Presidents Van Buren
and Buchanan, respectively, introduced bills in Congress that would have
provided for a federal bankruptcy system confined to banks.”212
Justifications for special rules for banks include concerns about bank runs
and the need for immediate access to deposits, but, as just explained, “it is
not clear that they remain convincing rationales for special rules today,”
particularly for SPNBs.213 And when it came time to enact the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978, the legislative history states only that “banking institutions
and insurance companies are excluded from liquidation under the bankruptcy
laws because they are bodies for which alternate provision is made for
their liquidation under various regulatory laws.”214 Another rationale for the
exclusion was supplied by the Second Circuit, which has held “that the only
operative intent behind the banking corporation exclusion was the avoidance
of conflict between state or federal regulatory procedures and the Bankruptcy
Act.”215
As a result, it is not clear if the driving rationale for exclusion is a
concern about federalism216 or the efficient resolution of distressed entities.217
To the extent that the concern is grounded in federalism and ensuring that
states retain primary control over the liquidation of wholly domestic entities,
that concern is misplaced in the context of SPNBs. SPNBs are creatures of
federal and state law. In addition, they are unlikely to operate wholly within
the jurisdiction of any one particular state. Their business models are not
212. Swire, supra note 97, at 478.
213. Swire, supra note 97, at 494.
214. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 318–19.
215. Green, supra note 96, at 914.
216. Green, supra note 96, at 908 (“[H]istory does tend to explain the exceptions in terms
of the considerations of federalism.”) (internal citations omitted).
217. Sovern, supra note 7, at 220 (“Unified and probably efficient insolvency
administration is available for national banks by virtue of the fact that Congress has vested
primary responsibility for their liquidation and rehabilitation in the Comptroller of the
Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,” making access to bankruptcy less
important.); Laura S. McAlister, The Inefficiencies of Exclusion: The Importance of Including
Insurance Companies in the Bankruptcy Code, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 129, 141 (2008)
(discussing the benefits of a single federal regime instead of state-based insolvency regimes
for insurers and noting that “the out-of-state proceedings that are required to reclaim the
insurer’s assets result in the duplicated efforts of the regulators”).
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bounded by state borders and so it would be surprising if their customers and
operations were strictly contained within a single state’s geographic
borders.218 Additionally, one of the primary advantages of the fintech charter
is to match a nationally operative entity with a single, national regulator.219
Finally, the costs of obtaining and maintaining a SPNB charter are and will
be considerable. As such, fintech companies who seek a SPNB charter are
likely to be larger entities, and therefore are unlikely to operate solely within
a single state. Thus, federalism concerns seemingly cannot justify excluding
SPNBs from bankruptcy because multiple states and the federal government
are likely to have an interest in the resolution of financially distressed
SPNBs.
Nonetheless, if the concern is one about avoiding conflicts between
competing insolvency regimes, such as the OCC’s liquidation procedures
and the Bankruptcy Code, it might be appropriate to exclude SPNBs from
bankruptcy. This reading also seems supported by the legislative history to
the Code itself, which expressed concern about there being alternatives
available to liquidate “under various regulatory laws.”220 That said, the vast
majority of regulatory regimes available to liquidate banks and insurance
companies in 1978 were under various state regulatory laws and so, perhaps,
the Code is primarily focused on federalism concerns, even if the issue was
not expressly couched in those terms. In addition, concerns about inefficient
conflicts between the NBA and bankruptcy law are not new. As far back as
the 19th century, courts recognized the potential for conflict.221 But, as noted
earlier, not all courts have been worried about the potential for inconsistent
insolvency regimes.222 Whether it is an action being removed from state to
federal court, conflicts between arbitrators and bankruptcy judges, or district
courts withdrawing the reference from bankruptcy courts, there are many
other instances where potential duplication of effort are tolerated, and this
does not seem especially different.
The fifth justification—that banks create systemic risk for the
economy—appears true for some banks but not (yet) for SPNBs.223 Like
218. See Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, supra note 30.
219. See Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, supra note 30.
220. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 318–19.
221. See supra text accompanying note 166.
222. See supra text accompanying note 167.
223. Others have referred to this rationale by a different name, such as the “public or quasipublic nature” of banks, which has been described as “the theory that banks touch ‘enough
persons who must deal with them at some economic disadvantage to require public
supervision and control.’” See Green, supra note 96, at 910. This seems to require that the
government have “a strong interest in assuring their soundness and in preventing the kinds of
systemic failures that led to financial devastation in the Depression.” Skeel, Law & Finance,
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bank lenders, fintech lenders are expected to loan money and demand its
repayment.224 Similarly, they are expected to securitize some of those
loans.225 And fintech payment firms maintain some of the financial plumbing
of the U.S. payments system. Because banks’ systemic importance is not
strictly linked to their status as depository institutions, SPNBs could also be
systemically important.
Undoubtedly, some banks are systemically important and “some are
individually large relative to GDP.”226 But fintech companies are not nearly
as large as traditional banks.227 Ally Bank is the only fintech entity on the
list of systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) in the United
States228 and none are on the Financial Stability Board’s list of global
SIFIs.229 In his work, Professor Christopher K. Odinet has made the case
supra note 4, at 723.
224. See Bruckner, Promise and Perils, supra note 45, at 32–33 & n.197 (describing how
fintech lenders fund their loans); see also Matthew A. Bruckner, Regulating Fintech Lending,
37 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1, 1 (2018); see also Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and
Marketplace Lending, supra note 45, at 789–93; see Vincent Di Lorenzo, Fintech Lending: A
Study of Expectations Versus Market Outcomes, 38 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 725, 737, 752–
53 (discussing potential default risks on repayment and expressing consumers’ concerns of
unaffordable terms of repayment).
225. Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, 52 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 477, 496–523
(2020) (discussing the structure and process of fintech securitizations and the systemic risk
arising from the accumulation of such securities combined with a lack of consistent
regulation); Christopher K. Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617,
1636, 1643 (2019) (describing the securitization of loans by fintech lenders and the growth of
overall fintech lending securitizations); see also Nick Clements, Led by Student Loans,
Marketplace Lending Securitization Volume Soars, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2016, 5:25 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/nickclements/2016/10/21/led-by-student-loans-marketplace-lendingsecuritization-volume-soars/?sh=38b0febc3c23 [https://perma.cc/82Y2-8LHZ].
226. Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at 2.
227. For example, as of November 4, 2020, fintech lender Lending Club’s market
capitalization was $0.42B and JPMorgan Chase’s was $305.52B (or almost 900x larger).
LendingClub Market Cap 2008-2021 | LC, MACROTRENDS (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.m
acrotrends.net/stocks/charts/LC/lendingclub/market-cap [https://perma.cc/63CS-BD7P]. In
the payments space, by contrast, fintech companies are growing more quickly in size and
importance. For example, as of November 4, 2020, Visa’s market capitalization was
$378.24B, PayPal’s was $220.3B, Square’s was $68.85B and American Express’s was
$75.21B. See Visa Market Cap 2007-2021 | V, MACROTRENDS (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www
.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/V/visa/market-cap [https://perma.cc/6HVG-YK6Y]; Publicly
Listed Fintech Companies – a Tale of Two Sectors, LENDACADEMNY (Sept. 20, 2020), https://
www.lendacademy.com/publicly-listed-fintech-companies-a-tale-of-two-sectors/ [https://per
ma.cc/UNF6-KFZH] (showing trends since 2018 to exemplify growth).
228. Emily Liner, Understanding SIFIs: What Makes an Institution Systemically
Important?, THIRD WAY (Nov. 6, 2015), http://thirdway.imgix.net/pdfs/understanding-sifiswhat-makes-an-institution-systemically-important.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4Q4-2WTC] (listing systemically important entities, only one is a fintech, Ally).
229. FIN. STABILITY BD., 2019 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (G-SIBS)
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that fintech lenders could become systemically important in the future.230
Although I’m not wholly convinced by Professor Odinet’s arguments, it
remains a possibility. Yet even he doesn’t argue that fintech companies are
systemically important right now. The consensus appears to be that fintech
firms are not systemically important at this time.231
Sixth, Hynes and Walt argue that it is important to have the residual
claimant in charge of a depository institution’s winding down because the
residual claimant will make value-maximizing decisions for the bank’s
assets.232 The FDIC is usually a bank’s residual claimant and it acts as the
receiver for most insolvent depository institutions.233 By contrast, the
bankruptcy process, diffuses authority through its “numerous formal and
informal mechanisms for creditors to exercise control over the liquidation
process” and thus allows creditors to assert their parochial views as to how
to maximize the value of the estate.234 For this reason, Ayotte and Skeel
suggest that creditors cannot be trusted to maximize the value of a failed
depository institution as well as the FDIC.235
However, in the case of SPNBs, the OCC is not the residual claimant

(Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P221119-1.pdf. [https://perma.cc/
6PU4-42WG].
230. See Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, supra note 225; see also
Christopher K. Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, supra note 225; see also Allen, supra
note 175, at 463 (“A failure of the infrastructure supporting retail payments processing could
certainly be systemic, however, and could be at least as debilitating as a financial crisis
transmitted through credit channels.”).
231. See FIN. STABILITY BD., FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH, 1 (June
27, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG98EUH3] (“the FSB concludes that there are currently no compelling financial stability risks
from emerging FinTech innovations.”); see also Lavinia Franco, Ana Laura Garcia, Vigor
Husetovic, and Jessica Lassiter, Does Fintech Contribute to Systemic Risk? Evidence from
the US and Europe, ADBI WORKING PAPERS (May 2020), https://www.adb.org/publication
s/does-fintech-contribute-systemic-risk-evidence-us-europe [https://perma.cc/MD66-KP2B]
(“[O]ur results show that these fintech firms do not contribute greatly to systemic risk.”). But
see Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE
J. ON REG. 736, 742 (2019) (expressing concerns about fintech’s ability to create systemic risk
by “amplify[ing] the system’s capacity to fuel financial speculation on an unprecedented
scale . . . [by] exacerbate[ing] the financial system’s dysfunctional tendency toward
unsustainably self-referential growth”); but see generally Allen, DRIVERLESS FINANCE:
FINTECH’S IMPACT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 15.
232. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 990.
233. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 1015 (discussing evidence that suggests “the
FDIC is truly the residual claimant in the overwhelming majority of bank insolvencies”).
234. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 165, at 483.
235. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 160, at 483; see also Ayotte & Elias, supra note 16, at
*21–37 (discussing certain instances where first lien creditors do not act to maximize the
value of the bankruptcy estate and instead only maximize their own recoveries).
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and therefore lacks the “skin-in-the-game” that Hynes and Walt use to justify
FDIC receiverships for insured depository institutions. Instead, the OCC
merely provides a neutral forum for adjudicating issues and offers itself as a
neutral decision-maker.236 But the OCC’s role is an expansive one and it
crowds out other interested parties, such as creditors, from participating.237
In FDIC receiverships that may make sense because the FDIC can be
expected to maximize the value of the estate. But with an insolvent SPNB,
we lack a single decision-maker with the incentives to maximize the value
of the bankrupt entity. Instead, we are forced to choose whether we will
allow creditors—who are generally incentivized to maximize the estate’s
value—an active role in the process.238 Since creditors have a greater
incentive to maximize the aggregate value of the estate to increase their slice
of the pie, it appears sensible to allow creditors greater participation rights
upon the insolvency of a SPNB than we allow upon the insolvency of an
insured depository institution. As a result, this appears to cut in favor of
allowing SPNBs to reorganize in bankruptcy.
The seventh rationale—preserving banks ongoing operations and
avoiding the liquidation of banks—is simply confusing as an argument for
preferring the OCC receivership process to bankruptcy.239 Bankruptcy does
not require the liquidation of debtors, and the OCC process does not
generally appear to contemplate preserving an entity as a going concern.240
As a result, the ability to reorganize in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding
is at least as likely to preserve the going concern value of a SPNB as the
OCC’s receivership process.241
Finally, the eighth rationale—avoiding the high costs of lost
confidence—is premised on the idea that “[t]he economic system regards
unregulated liquidation of a financial institution with alarm.”242 This concern
236. But see infra, text accompanying note 250.
237. See supra notes 223–231 (discussing how creditor participation rights are greater in
bankruptcy than in an OCC receivership).
238. First lien creditors are not always interested in maximizing the aggregate value of the
bankruptcy estate. See Ayotte & Elias, supra note 16.
239. See Green, supra note 96, at 910 (describing “the desirability of unarrested operation”
of banks as a rationale which courts have identified).
240. See Business Combinations - Uninsured National Bank Combining With an
Uninsured Depository Institution, Comptroller’s Licensing Manual, OFF. OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (2018), *13-15; see also 12 C.F.R. § 51.7 (2021) (appearing
to provide the OCC with the necessary latitude to negotiate purchase and assumption
agreements).
241. See Green, supra note 96, at 913–14 (arguing that the view of bankruptcy as
inappropriate “for winding up the complex affairs of banks [appears based on the view] that
the federal bankruptcy mechanism [requires] a complete winding up,” which is incorrect).
242. Eisenberg, supra note 169 (“Visions of depression era ‘runs on the banks’ have not
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should not apply to the bankruptcy process, which is neither “unregulated”
nor always a “liquidation.”243 Chapter 11 bankruptcy allows a chance for
reorganization, and whether an attempted reorganization will succeed or not,
is usually revealed relatively quickly.244
***
In summary, few of the rationales that have traditionally justified
excluding banks from bankruptcy are applicable to the case for excluding
SPNBs from bankruptcy. The best arguments for excluding SPNBs are
efficiency, expertise, the funding mismatch, and the “deposits” taken by
fintech payment processors. First, concerns about the efficient use of judicial
time and agency resources should make us worry about the potential for
duplicative efforts by bankruptcy courts and the OCC. Efficiency is not,
however, the paramount objective as evidenced by our tolerance for similar
inefficiencies in many other contexts. Standing alone, therefore, efficiency
appears insufficient to justify excluding SPNBs from bankruptcy
proceedings because the OCC has also provided for their resolution.
Second, the OCC’s relative expertise could also justify the exclusion of
SPNBs from bankruptcy, but only if we think that the OCC will actively
monitor SPNBs, quickly initiate insolvency proceedings when they are
required, and maximize the value of the estate. There are reasons to doubt
that this is true, but this rationale cannot be dismissed.
Third, SPNBs may have the same funding mismatch problems of
depository institutions if they rely on short-term funding to make loans and
because some hold customer funds.
Finally, customers may keep a credit balance with fintech payment
processors and can temporarily lose access to that money to that money
during the course of a bankruptcy case. It is not clear, however, that they
would fare better under the OCC’s new liquidation rules. And bankruptcy
seems up to the task of resolving the financial distress of overextended
SPNBs. Thus, none of the foregoing rationales appear to justify the
exclusion of SPNBs from bankruptcy, and none of the other historic reasons
vanished. Fear of extreme reactions underlies reluctance to allow the straightforward
liquidation of a bank or savings and loan association.”).
243. Eisenberg, supra note 169.
244. Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to
the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603 (2009) (finding that most chapter 11 cases that fail do so
(relatively) quickly). But see Rutger van Bergem, Todd J. Zywicki, & Jeff Jenkins,
Bankruptcy as Filtering Failure: Evidence of Filtering Failure in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Process, (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (Feb. 6, 2021 draft) (claiming that
bankruptcy law fails “to facilitate economic efficiency by enabling the reorganization of
economically viable but financially distressed firms and facilitating the liquidation of
economically failed firms”).
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for excluding banks from bankruptcy have purchase in the context of SPNBs.
The appropriate solution appears to be better prudential regulation instead of
denying entities access to the bankruptcy system.
IV.

DOES IT MATTER IF BANKS ARE EXCLUDED FROM
BANKRUPTCY?

By this point, I hope to have established that bankruptcy courts are
unlikely to rubber stamp the OCC’s decision to label certain non-depository
entities as “banks” based either on the statutory language or for policy
reasons. In this section, I explain why it matters. As Hynes and Walt write,
“[v]ery different rules govern the bankruptcy and bank receivership
processes. These rules appear in different titles of the United States Code
and have important substantive differences.”245 If SPNBs are allowed to use
bankruptcy, some parties-in-interest might prefer bankruptcy to the OCC’s
procedures for liquidating uninsured national banks. This section highlights
six of the most salient differences, including (i) bankruptcy rules are more
firmly established, (ii) judicial rather than administrative oversight in
bankruptcy cases, (iii) greater creditor participation rights in bankruptcy, (iv)
bankruptcy allows for some debtors to be reorganized instead of liquidated,
and (v) bankruptcy’s automatic stay and anti-discrimination provisions.
Additional differences are summarized in the Appendix.
There are significant differences between the OCC’s wind-down
processes and the Bankruptcy Code that could cause creditors to favor the
latter over the former. First and foremost, the bankruptcy process is wellestablished and is well understood by many professional advisors. By
contrast, “[t]he OCC has not appointed a receiver for an uninsured bank since
shortly after the Congress established the FDIC in response to the banking
panics of 1930-1933.”246 Because the OCC’s processes for uninsured
national banks are so new and the NBA’s procedures have lain fallow for so
long, neither courts nor professional advisors have experience with the OCC
process.
There is reason to doubt that the OCC process will be used extensively
if bankruptcy is an available alternative, and this is especially true while the
OCC’s process remains unfamiliar to many bankruptcy professionals.
Debtors have some discretion in where they file for bankruptcy cases. And
some bankruptcy professionals serve as “case placers,” arranging for

245. Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 987.
246. Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, 81 F.R. 62835, 62839 (proposed Sept.
13, 2016) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 51).
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bankruptcy cases to be heard in preferred jurisdictions.247 These case placers
may well prefer bankruptcy resolution to OCC resolution because
bankruptcy offers greater certainty for several reasons, including
bankruptcy’s longer track record, its more firmly established rules, and its
expert umpires.248 Professional advisors may also prefer bankruptcy for
more parochial reasons, including that their fees can be paid directly from
the bankruptcy estate but cannot be paid out of the receivership’s assets.249
Second, the OCC’s administrative proceeding is different than the
Bankruptcy Code’s judicial proceedings in a variety of other ways that
creditors are unlikely to prefer, including the absence of a neutral and wholly
disinterested decision-maker.250 Bankruptcy cases are supervised by two
neutral parties (e.g., the court and the U.S. Trustee) and a variety of interested
parties (e.g., various official and ad hoc committees, and individual partiesin-interest to the case) but the OCC process lacks a completely neutral
party.251 The OCC process lacks a completely neutral supervisory party
247. Lynn M. LoPucki, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 17 (2008) (discussing bankruptcy’s case placers—
those “lawyers, corporate executives, banks, and investment bankers who chose the courts for
their cases”—and how those they have been able to corrupt some bankruptcy judges);
Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current
Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 428 (2006) [hereinafter, Ayotte
& Skeel, Efficiency] (contesting LoPucki’s claims that case placers choose Delaware’s
bankruptcy courts because Delaware bankruptcy judges will approve their fees and arguing
that “the debtors that choose Delaware appear to be drawn by the Delaware court’s experience
in handling large Chapter 11 cases, and that companies that have substantial secured credit
are more likely to file in Delaware”); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Delaware
Bankruptcy: Failure in the Ascendancy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1387, 1390 (2006) (responding to
Ayotte and Skeel and arguing that Delaware’s bankruptcy reorganization methods have been
a “catastrophic failure”).
248. See Ayotte & Skeel, Efficiency, supra note 247, at 428 (arguing that case placers
choose Delaware’s bankruptcy courts because of “the Delaware court’s experience in
handling large Chapter 11 cases”); see also G. Marcus Cole & Todd J. Zywicki, Anna Nicole
Smith Goes Shopping: The New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
511 (discussing problems with forum shopping in bankruptcy when bankruptcy resolution
offers different substantive rights than other bodies of law); Swire, supra note 97, at 503–05
(describing the FDIC, not the OCC, as the expert in bank insolvency because the FDIC has
served as the receiver in “every modern bank insolvency” but cautioning that giving bank
regulators too much discretion “creates uncertainty for third parties”).
249. Lynn M. LoPucki, supra note 247, at 17 (discussing how bankruptcy judges compete
for cases by, among other thing, signaling their “willingness to approve higher fees for
bankruptcy lawyers who brought cases to the court”); cf. Matthew A. Bruckner,
Crowdsourcing (Bankruptcy) Fee Control, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 361 (2016) (reviewing the
literature on professional fees in bankruptcy cases, discussing concerns that those fees may
exceed reasonable amounts, and offering crowdsourcing as a solution to control them).
250. Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at 4.
251. See, e.g., Bruckner, supra note 7, at 735 (discussing judicial oversight over bankrupt
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because the OCC is the chartering entity for SPNBs but also supervises their
winddown and dissolution.252
Third, creditors and other parties-in-interest have fewer avenues to
participate in or to seek judicial review of the OCC’s administrative
proceeding as compared with the Bankruptcy Code’s judicial process.253 The
OCC alone may appoint a receiver.254 By contrast, a debtor or its creditors
can initiate the bankruptcy process.255 Creditors’ right to seek judicial review
of a receiver’s appointment by the OCC is more limited than the right of
parties-in-interest to a bankruptcy case to seek the transfer of a bankruptcy
case to a different venue or withdraw the case from the bankruptcy courts
altogether.256
entities).
252. This statement is not intended to cast aspersions on federal receivers but merely to
note there is an apparent conflict of interest between a receiver’s role in fair-handedly
administering the estate and avoiding a perception that the OCC failed in some way to
properly oversee the entity. In addition, the receiver may feel pressure to recover assets on
behalf of the federal government to the extent it provided any financial relief to the failed
institution.
253. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (“A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’
committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any
indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this
chapter.”); Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 987 (discussing important differences between
FDIC receiverships and bankruptcy in terms of “the concentration of control over the
disposition of the failed firm’s assets.”); Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note
8, at 26
Bankruptcy law, for all its complexity, is designed to ensure that all creditors
have representation and the process is supervised by a neutral party (the court) to
protect all creditors’ interests. Bank insolvency law is explicitly designed to
primarily protect the interests of a senior creditor by giving that creditor control,
limiting oversight, and mandating least cost (to the senior creditor) resolution.
cf. Bliss & Kaufman, Comparison, supra note 15, at 48–49 (discussing differences between
the bankruptcy and FDIA processes). Bliss & Kaufman are critical of giving the FDIC control
over bank resolution because “No neutral party is interposed in the process to protect the
interests of the other creditors.” Bliss & Kaufman, Economic Comparison, supra note 8, at
26. But that concern is diminished in an OCC receivership because the OCC does not have a
financial interest in the outcome of the receivership, unlike the FDIC. In this regard, OCC
receiverships are more similar to bankruptcy than to FDIC receiverships.
254. See 12 C.F.R. § 51.2(b) (“The Comptroller may appoint a receiver for an uninsured
bank based on any of the grounds specified in 12 U.S.C. 191(a).”).
255. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303.
256. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 51.2(b) (“The Comptroller may appoint a receiver for an
uninsured bank based on any of the grounds specified in 12 U.S.C. 191(a).”) and 12 C.F.R.
§ 51.2(c) (“If the Comptroller appoints a receiver for an uninsured bank, the bank may seek
judicial review of the appointment as provided in 12 U.S.C. 191(b).”) and Boyd v. Schneider,
124 F. 239, 242 (N.D. Ill. 1903) (The comptroller “alone can determine the need of and
appoint a receiver.”) and Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (explaining that to have
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As Hynes and Walt note, whether a bankruptcy is resolved consensually
or crammed down over the objections of some dissenting creditors, “the
debtor must win approval of at least some creditors, and the other creditors
can ask the judge to reject the plan because it fails to comply with tests of
horizontal and vertical equity or it is not in the best interests of the
creditors.”257 Even where cram down is possible, dominant creditors often
make concessions to other creditors to obtain a consensual reorganization.258
And parties-in-interest, including the debtor, creditors, acting individually or
through a committee, and equity holders, acting individually or through a
committee, “may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue” in a
chapter 11 case.259
Fourth, there are also many specific differences in the rules applicable
in bankruptcy and an OCC receivership such that creditors may prefer
bankruptcy.260 Although most bankruptcy petitions are voluntarily filed by
the debtor261 (and not the creditors), bankruptcy filings are often precipitated
by actions taken by creditors.262 If, for example, creditors favor reorganizing
the entity over liquidating it or think that keeping a debtor’s more
experienced management running the business would help maximize their

standing to sue plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have suffered an “‘injury in fact,’ that
the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be
redressed by a favorable decision”) with FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a) (providing for the transfer
of a case to “any other district if the court determines that the transfer is in the interest of
justice or for the convenience of the parties”) and FED. R. BANKR. P. 5011.
257. Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 987.
258. Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 995–96 (arguing that plan confirmation process
favors deal-making over bankruptcy hardball).
259. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (emphasis added).
260. See Skeel, Law & Finance, supra note 4, at 772–73 (discussing the “daunting”
downsides of reorganizing banks, but many of the author’s concerns do not seem to apply to
SPNBs).
261. 11 U.S.C. § 301.
262. See, e.g., Chrysler LLC v. Plastech Engineered Products, Inc. (In re Plastech
Engineered Products, Inc.), 382 B.R. 90, 103 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (describing how the
debtor’s chapter 11 filing was precipitated when Chrysler obtained
an ex parte temporary restraining order and order of possession that required the
Debtor to immediately deliver possession of all of the tooling that it utilized in
the production of Chrysler’s parts, allow Chrysler immediate access to the
Debtor’s facilities to inspect, load, remove and transport the tooling, and to
provide all reasonable and necessary assistance to Chrysler to take possession of
the tooling.)
While creditors, like Chrysler in the Plastech case, can often push a debtor into bankruptcy,
involuntary bankruptcy petitions are rarely filed by creditors. See Richard M. Hynes & Steven
D. Walt, Revitalizing Involuntary Bankruptcy, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1127 (2020) (“Involuntary
petitions filed by creditors now account for less than 0.05 percent of all petitions.”)
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returns, they will favor bankruptcy. In such cases, they will favor bankruptcy
because the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to attempt to reorganize and
leaves incumbent management in control.263 By contrast, the OCC’s process
aims for an expeditious liquidation and displaces the debtor’s existing
managers.264
Another difference between the two resolution processes is that only
bankruptcy offers a broad injunction against most actions that will negatively
affect the debtor (the so-called automatic stay), which applies immediately
and automatically upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.265 By contrast,
the NBA and accompanying regulations appears to lack a comparable
provision.266 The OCC’s recently finalized rules do provide that “the
receiver for an uninsured bank may exercise other rights, privileges, and
powers authorized for receivers of national banks under the NBA and the
common law of receiverships as applied by the courts to receiverships of
national banks conducted under the NBA.”267 But when providing examples
of a receiver’s common law powers, an injunction is not among the listed
powers.268 Moreover, the OCC has specifically disclaimed any right to “stay,

263. See Matthew Bruckner, The Virtue in Bankruptcy, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 233, 275
(2013) (“Chapter 11 is biased toward the rehabilitation of financially distressed companies
and their reorganization into viable, going concerns.”); see also Bliss & Kaufman, Economic
Comparison, supra note 17, at 4.
264. See supra note 263.
265. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
266. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A) (providing for a stay of between 45 and 90
days when an conservator or receiver is appointed for an insured depository institution and
only upon the request of the conservator or receiver) with 12 C.F.R. § 51.7(c) (lacking express
language providing for an injunction against creditor collection activity or government action
and providing only that “[t]he receiver for an uninsured bank may exercise other rights,
privileges, and powers authorized for receivers of national banks under the NBA and the
common law of receiverships as applied by the courts to receiverships of national banks
conducted under the NBA.”). Cf. Banking Law Scholars Brief, supra note 40, at 31–32 (“The
NBA[] . . . lacks an automatic stay . . . “).
267. 12 C.F.R. § 51.7(c).
268. RECEIVERSHIPS FOR UNINSURED NATIONAL BANKS, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-12-20/pdf/2016-30666.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CD52-3HTF] (providing the following examples:
(1) the authority to repudiate certain contracts, including: (a) purely executory
contracts, upon determining that the contracts would be unduly burdensome or
unprofitable for the receivership estate, (b) contracts that involve fraud or
misrepresentation, and (c) in limited cases, non-executory contracts that are
contrary to public policy; (2) the authority to recover fraudulent transfers; and (3)
the authority to enforce collection of notes from debtors and collateral, regardless
of the existence of side arrangements that would otherwise defeat the
collectability of such notes.)
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delay or hinder a secured party’s remedies with respect to collateral security”
in certain circumstances, such as the when a creditor asserts a right to
setoff.269
Certain creditors may prefer bankruptcy to the OCC process because of
the automatic stay’s availability. While the automatic stay is often thought
to benefit the debtor at the expense of its creditors, it also benefits creditors
in many circumstances. For example, unsecured creditors might be protected
by the stay preventing a secured creditor from seizing an important piece of
the debtor’s collateral, which could allow the debtor’s business to remain
operational.
Most importantly, the debtor or its creditors might seek to use the
automatic stay or the Code’s anti-discrimination provisions to prevent the
OCC from terminating a SPNB’s charter. Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code provides that filing a bankruptcy petition creates an estate that contains
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”270 Although it is not free from doubt, a SPNB
arguably has a property interest in its OCC charter, thus making the charter
property of the estate.271 For example, a debtor’s accreditation or licensure

269. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter #733, Interpretations
and Actions (July 1996), https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretationsand-actions/1996/int733.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSK3-3JZE] (citing Bell v. Hanover National
Bank, 57 F. 821, 822 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893) and Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 510 (1892)).
Contrast 12 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2)
The conservator may request that any judicial action or proceeding to which the
conservator or the bank is or may become a party be stayed for a period of up to
45 days after the appointment of the conservator. Upon petition, the court shall
grant such stay as to all parties.
Cf. Bliss & Kaufman, Comparison, supra note 15, at 48 (discussing differences between the
bankruptcy stay and the power to stay actions under the FDIA); Bliss & Kaufman, Economic
Comparison, supra note 8, at 12–14; Hynes & Walt, supra note 159, at 988–99 (discussing
stays of litigation in both FDIC receiverships and bankruptcy proceedings).
270. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
271. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.06[3] (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th
ed.) (“Under sections 541(a)(1) and 541(c)(1), licenses become property of the estate
notwithstanding restrictions on transfer, such as the approval of state officials or execution of
papers by the debtor.”). But cf. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re
Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 942 (5th Cir. 1983) (describing a debtor airline’s airport
landing slots as “restrictions on the use of property -- airplanes; not property in themselves.”);
D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. v. Lake Erie Communications, Inc. (In re D.H. Overmyer
Telecasting Co.), 35 B.R. 400, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (calling an FCC broadcasting
license “a property right only in a limited sense”). In both of these cases, however, the debtor
sought to transfer its rights to the landing slots and broadcasting license to a third party. The
result may well be different if the debtor merely passively sought to retain the use of the slots
or to continue broadcasting. Cf. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S.Ct. 585 (2020) (discussing

2021]

WHO'S DOWN WITH OCC

201

status as an educational institution is not property of the estate, but only
because it has expressly been carved out of definition.272 A bank charter,
which authorizes an entity to operate as a bank, appears similar to state
licensure, which also provides the legal authority to operate in a state.
Even if a SPNB’s charter is property of the estate, the OCC retains the
authority to terminate the charter, but the Bankruptcy Code circumscribes
the OCC’s authority in several ways. First, the automatic stay would limit
the OCC’s authority to rescind the license, thus exercising control over
property of the estate, unless it was enforcing its police or regulatory
power.273 So long as the OCC is acting out of a concern with public safety
and welfare and not in its pecuniary interest, the regulatory power exception
to the automatic stay is applicable.274 And the OCC may well be able to
argue successfully that closing a poorly-performing SPNB is in the public
interest. But the issue is not free from doubt.
Second, the OCC cannot terminate a SPNB’s charter because of its
bankruptcy filing due to the limitation set forth in section 525(a). Section
525 provides that:
a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to
renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant
to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a
grant against . . . a person that is or has been a debtor under [the
Bankruptcy Code] . . . , has been insolvent before the
commencement of the case under this title, . . .
Whether or not a SPNB charter is included in the protections of section
525(a) is not free from doubt either, but Collier’s suggests that “this

a creditor’s passive retention of automobiles seized pre-petition).
272. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3); Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher Education, supra note 7, at
715 (“Nevertheless, at least two courts have allowed the ED to terminate a college’s Title IV
eligibility because it filed for bankruptcy relief, section 525(a) notwithstanding.”).
273. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (providing for a stay of “any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate”); 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (providing an exception for “the commencement or
continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit . . . to enforce such
governmental unit’s or organization’s police and regulatory power”).
274. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 272, at ¶ 362.05[5][a] at 10-11
To determine whether an action is excepted from the automatic stay as a police
or regulatory power action or simply a collection action, the courts have
developed two tests to judge the government’s action:—the pecuniary purpose
test (is the governmental unit pursuing a matter of public safety and welfare rather
than a governmental pecuniary interest?); and—the public policy test (is the
government action designed to effectuate public policy rather than to adjudicate
private rights?
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provision be interpreted broadly.”275 Collier’s describes the “[t]he common
qualities of the property interests protected under section 525(a), . . . [as]
property interests [that] are unobtainable from the private sector and essential
to a debtor’s fresh start.”276 The SPNB charter fits squarely within this
definition. This restriction is a limited one, however. It would prevent the
OCC from terminating a SPNB charter because of the bankruptcy filing, but
not for other reasons, such as the entity’s financial mismanagement.
In summary, there are many salient differences between the OCC’s
administrative liquidation process for banks and the bankruptcy system.277
Debtors, creditors, and other parties-in-interest might prefer to take
advantage of the Bankruptcy Code instead of allowing a SPNB to be
liquidated. And they are likely able to do so for the reasons set forth in
Sections II and III.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy protection appears to be an option if a special purpose
national bank runs into financial distress and its creditors or management
prefer bankruptcy to the OCC liquidation process.278 As highlighted

275. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 272 at ¶ 525.02[5] (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367 (1977), reprinted in App. Pt. 4(d)(i) infra; S. Rep. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1978), reprinted in App. Pt. 4(e)(i) infra.).
276. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 272 at ¶ 525.02[5]. Cf. Matthew Adam
Bruckner, Higher Ed “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders, 106 KY. L.J. 223, 260 n.249 (2017)
(discussing 525(a)’s applicability to healthcare entities and noting “courts have not allowed
HHS or CMS to terminate a healthcare provider’s Medicare eligibility because of its
bankruptcy filing”).
277. Additional differences are contained in the Appendix.
278. Arguably, the appointment of a receiver should deprive the debtor’s management of
the right to file a chapter 11 petition. See, e.g., In re Gen-Air Plumbing & Remodeling, Inc.,
208 B.R. 426 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (“Moreover, Illinois law provides that when a receiver
is appointed, the functions of the corporation’s managers and officers are suspended and the
receiver stands in their place.”). See Prairie States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Sales
Corp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 753, 759 (1st Dist. 1980) (citation omitted); see also 19
C.J.S. Corporations § 779 (1990)
[I]nsofar as the appointment of a receiver vests the right to control the corporate
property, it is obvious that the directors and officers of the corporation are, by the
appointment, deprived of authority over or control thereof, and this result follows
where the order appointing the receiver expressly restrains the corporation and
its officers from exercising any of the privileges and franchises of the corporation
until the further order of the court.
(footnotes omitted). Courts in other jurisdictions in cases not involving Illinois corporate law
have held, however, that the appointment of a receiver does not deprive the corporate directors
of the power to file a bankruptcy petition. See, e.g., In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77, 79 (2d
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immediately above, there are many reasons why they might prefer
bankruptcy courts to exercise jurisdiction. As such, policymakers should
take heed of this important issue.
The OCC appears committed to providing innovative, though
questionable, bank charters, regardless of whether the OCC is headed by a
Democratic or a Republican Comptroller. Even if no entity ever obtains a
SPNB charter under the OCC’s current scheme, we can expect this idea to
re-emerge later. This Article is intended to highlight the importance of
addressing a SPNB’s bankruptcy eligibility.

Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 646 (1935).
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APPENDIX
Summary of differences between the OCC process and the Bankruptcy
Code
Body of law
Key
characteristic

Entities covered

Objectives

Initiator

Oversight

BANKRUPTCY
CODE
Every type,
except banks, thrifts,
insurance
companies,
and
businesses
that
violate federal law.
Maximize
value of debtor’s
assets for benefit of
creditors, including
preserving the debtor
as a going concern
(when appropriate).
Treat
similarly
situated
creditors similarly
(i.e., equality is
equity).
Voluntarily
initiated, usually by
the
debtor’s
management.
Can
be
involuntarily
initiated by the
debtor’s creditors,
but this is very rare.
Oversight
offered
by
bankruptcy
court,

OCC
RESOLUTION

Nondepository banks

Efficiently
resolve failing or
failed uninsured
national banks.

OCC
initiates
o Debtor’s
management and
creditors have no
role

Primarily
administrative and,
therefore,
more
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the DOJ (via the
Office of the United
States Trustee, and
by creditors.
Parties have
legal representation.
Appellate
judicial review of
most
bankruptcy
court decisions is
available.
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political in nature
with a particular
worry
about
conflicts of interest
between
a
receiver’s role in
fair-handedly
administering the
estate and the
federal
government’s
financial interest in
getting repaid for
any financial relief
to
the
failed
institution.
Some
judicial
review,
but Comptroller
has
substantial
discretion to act
without review by
the courts.
Management,
Creditor
Debtor
Manageme
and Shareholder Rights
remains
“in nt displaced by the
possession” (DIP)
receiver.
Creditors
Creditors
and
shareholders and equity have no
retain
substantial managerial rights.
control over various
important decisions
in
the
case
(depending on the
solvency of the
bankrupt entity)
Automatic Stay?
Yes
No
Allows reorganization?
Yes
No
May borrow new money?
Yes
No
Priority of distributions
Distributional
Distributional
to unsecured creditors and priorities are forth in priorities are forth
equity interests
11 U.S.C. § 507. in 12 CFR § 51.5.
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Notably
these
priorities
include
administrative
expenses of case,
such as
certain
employee
wage/severance/etc.
claims. ($12,850)
Certain
deposits of money by
individuals ($2,850)
Certain
government
tax
claims

These are:
(1)
administrative
expenses of the
receiver;
(2) unsecured
creditors,
including secured
creditors to the
extent their claims
exceed their valid
and
enforceable
security interests;
(3) creditors
of the uninsured
bank,
if
any,
whose claims are
subordinated
to
general
creditor
claims; and (4)
shareholders of the
uninsured bank. 12
CFR § 51.5

“Disintereste
d” persons that are
approved by the
Bankruptcy Court
may
represent
parties-in-interest.

Parties to
the case may hire
who they like. The
receiver does not
approve
the
representation of
parties-in-interest
and the estate does
not pay their fees.
Publication
notice.
o Unclear
about
whether
notice is provided
directly to known
claimholders.

Publication
notice
o Notice
is
also
provided
directly to all known
claimholders
and
interest
holders
listed on the debtor’s
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Claims process

Debt settlement
Sale of assets

schedules.
Bar date set by
the court.
Late
filed
claims are generally
inadmissible.
Claims are
prima facie valid.
Form
is
generally
standardized and is
relatively straightforward to fill out.

Requires
court approval
A debtor-inpossession
may
operate
in
the
ordinary course of
business
without
court approval.
Must
get
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No bar date;
instead,
the notice of
the receivership
includes
instructions
for
creditors and other
claimants
about
the
claim
submission
process.
Late filed
claims may be
adjudicated valid
by a court of law
(but not by the
receiver).
Claims are
not prima facie
valid.
o OCC
determines
the
claim’s validity,
but the basis for
doing so is not
immediately clear.
o Debtor’s
books and records
are relevant (but
not
clearly
dispositive)
Requires
court approval
Receiver
requires
court
approval to sell the
real or personal
property of an
uninsured bank.
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court approval to
operate outside of
the ordinary course
of business
Professional fees incurred
Court must
on behalf of the estate.
approve
compensation
scheme in advance
and retains full
discretion to refuse
to approve the fees
of
the
estate’s
professional
representatives.
Any
fees
awarded during the
course
of
a
bankruptcy case are
awarded on a strictly
interim basis and are
subject
to
be
returned until a final
fee application is
approved.

279. 12 C.F.R. § 51.7(2)
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“The
Comptroller may
reduce the fees of
the receiver for an
uninsured bank if,
in
the
Comptroller’s
discretion,
the
Comptroller finds
the performance of
the receiver to be
deficient, or the
fees of the receiver
to be excessive,
unreasonable, or
beyond the scope
of
the
work
assigned to the
receiver.”279

